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José Manuel Martínez Sierra 
The Spanish Presidency – Buying more 
than it can choose? 
I. Introduction 
The Spanish 2002 Presidency of the European Union set off on January, the1
st. 
During the six months of this Presidency, the Spanish Government attempted 
to harmonize its interest with the EU agenda. The EU Presidency is the 
highlight of any Member State in the Union life, though not being the owner 
of the Rolls Royce you drive. Thus temptations to get your way are high, even 
if your most desirable path goes against the wishes of other Member States or 
(even worst) against the common interest of the Union.  
One may think that the common interest of the Union can easily be preserved 
by the Presidency, through multilateral state contacts at Coreper II or/and 
bilateral contacts with the institutions. But this may in fact not be so. Yet, in 
reality, we find discrepancies, resulting from problems that are rooted in the 
procedural and in the political realms. One should notice that the guidelines of 
a Presidency are put forward unilaterally long before the Presidency starts, 
normally without fully seeking other actors’ opinions (states, institutions, 
national actors, etc.) in order to elaborate the agenda. For instance, the 
Belgium Presidency “priority program” came out on May, the 2
nd. By then, 
one-third of the Swedish Presidency was still forthcoming and consequently, 
the theoretical “troika link” among presidencies could not be defined. Simply José Manuel Martínez Sierra 
because those last links of the chain were not in place. The same can be said 
about the Program of the Spanish Presidency of the EU: “More Europe”.
1 
The agendas of Member States and the EU do not fully coincide, furthermore 
they can be partially contradictory. As far as Member States are concerned, 
this reality does not change for the simple fact of holding the Presidency of the 
Union, as the intrinsic nature of the State interest does not mutate. In short, 
one can say: the closer the agendas (EU-Presidency), the better the outcome of 
the Presidency. 
During the Spanish Presidency one could detect a great variety of agenda 
scenarios, i.e. common high interest of both parties (Euro), high Presidency 
interest with moderate interest of the EU (terrorism, migration), a high interest 
of the EU with little of the Presidency (enlargement), High Presidency interest 
with little coming from EU (EU-Latin American relationship). These diverse 
agenda scenarios determined not only the agenda of the Presidency but also 
the workload and effort put in each item of the final agenda. 
This paper, in its second and most significant part, will examine the main 
issues faced by the Spanish Presidency from a sectoral and global perspective. 
From there we will draft some observations about the concrete outcome of the 
Presidency as well as the feasibility of the current Presidency method in an 
enlarged Europe. This second dimension of the conclusions will also refer to 
the theoretical approach to the Presidency set up in the first part of this paper, 
The EU Presidency in its context. 
 
1  “More Europe: Program of the Spanish Presidency of the EU”, 1-1/30-6-2002, 
Imprenta Nacional del Boletín del Estado, 2001. Here in after cited as “More Europe”. 
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II.  The EU Presidency in its context: tasks and powers 
of a European President 
General Remarks 
The Treaties do not define the tasks of the Presidency, the same applies for the 
Council’s Rules of Procedure. However, there are a number of specific 
indications to which the Council’s Rules of Procedure, in a non-systematic 
way, add various procedural and technical details helping to define the duties 
of the Presidency.
2 
The main rule regulated in the Treaty is: “the office of President shall be held 
in turn by each Member State in the Council for a term of six months ...”. That 
rule has remained unchanged since it was established for six Member States, 
which means that a Member State now has the Presidency once every seven 
and a half years instead of once every three years; this will take place every 12 
to 15 years in a Union with 25 to 30 Member States. Such a reality, as we will 
see, requires a serious reflection concerning the institutional dimension of the 
Presidency, since it calls for significant changes in order to keep a minimum 
efficiency standard. Simultaneously, the new scenario, shortening the total 
time in which a Member State will hold the Presidency chair, can facilitate a 
reform so far as to elude political resistance. 
In the beginning, presidencies succeeded each other in alphabetical order. 
Since the Maastricht Treaty the Council unanimously decided the order that 
has to be followed, which provided greater flexibility in adapting to 
circumstances or requirements. The rationale of current rotation order tries to 
maintain one of the five biggest Member States in the Troika. With the 
exception of a few Council bodies that elect a chairman among their members, 
the Presidency is a single entity both horizontally, since it reaches all EC and 
EU areas of jurisdiction; and vertically, as it covers the Council, Coreper and 
all the Council’s subordinated bodies. Once again, this second dimension, is 
 
2  The Council’s Rules of Procedure are published in OJ L 247, 12-6-1999. 
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not formally regulated in the Treaty, which, as we have seen, confines itself to 
lay down a six-monthly rotation only for the Council itself. Regardless of that 
fact, as a well-settled custom, every six months, not only does the Presidency 
of some 20 different Councils change, but so does the chairmanship of some 
250 committees and working parties. 
In its origin, the Presidency was purely formal and semi-honorary, mainly 
because of its lack of complexity: just six members, few competencies, and 
therefore really easy to control. Since the 1970s, its role has become 
increasingly substantial and “institutional” with successive enlargements and 
the expansion of powers. All these were accompanied by a proliferation of 
Council formations and its subordinated bodies and hence an increased need 
for coordination and leadership. Furthermore, there has been a parallel 
expansion in political cooperation, the functioning as well as the practical 
framework on which has depended the administrative apparatus of the 
Presidency. 
Tasks and powers of a European President 
In the highly recommendable ZEI working paper precedent to this one, so far 
EU presidencies are concerned, Hendrik Voss and Emilie Bailleul propose the 
readers the following distinction when contextualisating theoretically EU 
presidencies: on the one hand, the President’s tasks, on the other, his powers.
3 
The authors describe the traditional tasks, namely: the President is in charge of 
organizational and administrative-technical affairs; lays down the agenda of 
the meetings; is expected to play a mediatory role; and has a representative 
function. In relation with the powers of the President, the authors take a 
minimalist approach focusing on the power to set up the agenda for the 
meetings. Also analyzing that unique power the minimalist approach remains 
predominant. In their view, a President can decide autonomously on the issues 
that will and will not be discussed. Yet in practice, this is hardly ever the case.  
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“The daily running Europe cannot split up in six-month parts. It has its own 
dynamics, and these are to a large extent determined by the rolling programme. 
Especially in the so-called first pillar [...], a legislative proposal can be ‘pending’ 
for months, even years”.
4  
Certainly, the legislative machinery, as a Rolling Stone, generates a procedural 
inertia that cannot depend on presidencies. There is not much room (and never 
was) for initiating and approving any concrete legislative act in the period of 
six months: surely not in a field disciplined by unanimity in the Council, nor 
when facing highly technical matters, neither when the codecision procedure 
is involved. From the Commission legislative reports till the OJ publication of 
a Secondary Law act, the EC institutional framework does not hold its 
activities until a new Presidency comes on board. For a majority of ongoing 
portfolios life goes on. The Presidency is not a dictatorship, neither is it the 
unique actor in the decision-making process. In addition, one should bear in 
mind that every Presidency attempts to interfere erga omnes in any Pillar, not 
only in the first. The Member State agrees with the majority of the legislative 
dossiers. No country joins (not even Great Britain) a supranational 
organization so powerful as the EU to promote the status quo, and this 
rationale does not change for the fact of holding the Presidency. Hence, the 
Member State holding the Presidency concentrates in those fields of greater 
interest, which could be initiated at the beginning of his term, in order to 
promote positive actions. On the other hand, the Presidency in a negative 
dimension, can simply use his “enhanced power” to block or to delay the 
approval of a legislative act during his Presidency term. 
Here I suggest a different analytical approach: every Presidency task can 
potentially turn into a power. There are two ways in which the Presidency 
actualizes such potentialities: a negative, acting as a break in the decision-
making process and a positive, pushing it forward.  
 
3  The Belgian Presidency and the post-Nice process after Laeken, ZEI Discussion Paper, 
C 102, 2002, pp. 5-8. 
4  Ibid., p. 6. 
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III.  The negative dimension 
Once the Presidency identifies its priority items, it addresses its efforts to 
control their tempo. Here is when the President’s tasks become his powers, 
each in its own dimension.
5 As previously said, the President lays down the 
agenda of the meetings. It is not politically correct to ignore a Commission’s 
proposal by not including it on the Council agenda. Legally it can be done and 
formal excuses to do so will not be scarce. Furthermore, a Commission’s 
action before the Court of Justice (doing here abstraction of the complexity 
inherent in the action for failure to act)
6 will simply be useless to prevent the 
blocking goal of the Presidency, due to the extensive period taken by the 
European Court on its rulings. Normally, blocking strategies are sharper and 
combine the “agenda freezing” with the following instruments.  
The President, as we already know, is in charge of organizational and 
administrative-technical affairs. For instance, he determines the time that has 
to be devoted to an item of the agenda and in addition, when to proceed to the 
voting. One does not need much time in the Council Working Groups and 
Coreper to realize that to include a point in the “A list” can be a question 
concerning when and how to reach a consensus. Thus, to reduce the time 
devoted to an item (with 15 members, the more the better for this purpose) 
will narrow down the chances for reaching a fast agreement or will provoke a 
disagreement that will postpone the debate for other Working Groups or 
Coreper meeting. At this stage the “agenda freezing” will again find 
protagonists.  
 
5  We follow here again the scheme put up by Hendrik Voss and Emilie Bailleul, The 
Belgian Presidency and the post-Nice process after Laeken, cit. pp., 5-6. 
6  See for instance: Case 48/65, Lütticke v. Commission [1966] E.C.R., 19; Case 42/71, 
Nordgetreide v. Commission [1972] E.C.R., 105; Case 59/70, Netherlands v. 
Commission [1971] E.C.R., 639; Case 247/87, Star Fruit v. Commission [1989] E.C.R., 
291; Joined Cases 166 and 220/86, Irish Cement Ltd. v. Commission [1988] E.C.R., 
6473; Case 377/89, Parliament v. Council [1988] E.C.R., 4017. 
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The same combination could be achieved through the President’s mediatory 
role. For instance, the President can take advantage of the national 
delegation’s consultants. As it is well-known, a national delegation can 
request the Presidency for the time before taking a definitive position about a 
disputed legal act in order to do compulsory consultants with its capital (head 
quarters of its Ministry). In these cases, the President will postpone the 
Working Group study of the pertinent legal act, waiting formally until the 
cited consultation takes place. The end of these consultations, usually object of 
written notification from the delegation to the Presidency (if the matter does 
not appear in coming meetings), will not necessarily be followed by an 
immediate inclusion in the agenda. This delaying tactic, being perfectly 
covered by a non-written Council’s custom consisting in looking for the 
consensus, is applicable even, when at first view, the Member States asking 
for consultation cannot reach the block minority. 
The last task-power exercise by the Presidency that demands a reflection in 
this context is the representative function. In its external dimension, it is 
necessary to consider the field affected. In the sphere of external economic 
relations, it rarely represents the European Communities, as this is generally a 
matter of the Commission. On the contrary, in CFSP matters, the Presidency 
always represents the European Union and where appropriate expresses the 
Union’s common positions. Since the Amsterdam Treaty, the Council can 
request the Presidency to negotiate international agreements on behalf of the 
Union. In JHA affairs, a lesser external representation role was given. In 
addition, the Presidency is responsible, together with the Commission, for 
ensuring the consistency of the Union’s action on the international level. 
Generally speaking, in the intergovernmental field, the principal boundary to 
the Presidency’s influence appears with Mr. PESC. Currently, after three years 
observing the personal impetus that Javier Solana gave to the High 
Representative office (rarely recognized in its full dimension), we can affirm 
that the Presidency has less room for abusing the representative function.  
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In its internal-institutional dimension, the representative function offers 
interesting possibilities to the decision-making process. Particularly in the 
codecision procedure, which, after Nice, applies in almost half of the 
substantial EC Treaty legal basis. In this legislative procedure, the interaction 
between the Council and the European Parliament is essential and permanent. 
The Presidency, through the General Secretariat (Dorsal Codecision-DG F III) 
and/or its national civil servants at the Permanent Representation, interacts 
with the European Parliament on every level: with the rapporteur, in the 
pertinent Parliament Commission, at the Plenary sessions and in the trialogues 
that prepare the conciliation meetings. It is the only source of information 
about the Parliament, unless a conciliation procedure takes place and other 
Member States directly address the Parliament Members’ part of the 
Conciliation Committee. At the same time, it is the only information source 
for the Council (in every of its organs) that covers the European Parliament 
state of mind surrounding the proposal at every stage of the procedure. The 
Commission does not cover the bilateral contacts between the co-legislators, 
and being a party in the process, its information may lack neutrality. The 
information control and the bargaining is precisely what can make the 
Member State holding the Presidency introduce (or delete) some (un)desirable 
aspects in (from) the legislative draft.
7 
All the possibilities mentioned in the negative dimension (allow me to repeat 
it once again) are not generally applicable, but concentrate in few dossiers of 
maximum interest for the Presidency in office. One should consider that the 
legislative status quo during six months in a concrete matter has significant 
political and economic implications. Imagine a six months delay in the 
Common Agricultural Policy reform. Why did Commissioner Fischer wait 
until the Spanish Presidency’s term ended to present the CAP reform? 
 
7  The assertion sketched here demands obviously greater argumentation, therefore I 
submit the 3rd chapter of my monography on codecision, El procedimiento legislativo 
de la cocecisión: de Maastricht a Nizza, Tirant lo Blach-Polo Europeo, Valencia 
forthcoming.  
  10The Spanish Presidency – Buying more than it can choose? 
Certainly not because of the lack of urgency. Actually, the Danish Presidency 
and the majority of Member States hold 2004 as deadline for the enlargement 
of the ten candidates. Whilst the positive contributors to the EU budget 
(except France) have urged for the deepest reform possible of the CAP in 
order not to block the enlargement. Then the answer is simple: the Spanish 
Presidency could have been able of vetoing, or even worst for the 
Commission, being capable to conduct the proposals into a Mediterranean 
reinforce minority (do not forget about Ireland) that could have changed the 
starting legislative scenario introducing a definitive slant. 
IV.  The positive dimension 
In its positive dimension, the Presidency has the most privileged position to 
introduce new issues in the decision-making process machinery. Even if we 
take the most minimalist approach to the Presidency potentialities, we may 
agree that on that “chair” any Member State will be in the better position ever, 
particularly to “urge” the Commission to enact an initiative as allowed by EC 
Treaty after Amsterdam. Acknowledging that this new instrument was a small 
pay-off for those who attempted to remove the most precious weapon from the 
communitarian executive (the right to put forward proposals of Community 
acts
8 and to alter or withdraw its proposals
9), we should realize 
 
8  Within certain limits basically defined by the European Court of Justice: Case 25/70, 
Köstner [1970] E.C.R. 1161; Case 16/88, Council v. Commission [1989] E.C.R. 3457. 
9  Although, in Primary Law, there is no explicit provision enabling the Commission to 
withdraw a proposal that has been submitted to the Council (and Parliament in 
Codecision), it has been along the time generally agreed that, within certain limits, the 
Commission has such a power, see: Mégret et al., Le droit de la CEE, Editions de 
l’Université de Bruxelles, 1979, Vol. 9, pp. 135-136; D. Wyatt and A. Dashwood, 
European Community Law, Sweet and Maxwell, London, pp. 47-48. 
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that the Member State in charge of the Presidency is the most qualified to take 
advantage of that margin.  
The most significant instrument of influence (I am not saying “force”) the 
Commission’s agenda did not come through a Primary Law reform, but 
through the evolution of the European Council. Since Giscard d’Estaing, after 
a long “romance” with Helmut Schmidt,
10 pronounced his famous “Le sommet 
européen est mort, vive le Conseil européen,”
11 the European Council has 
become what larger Member States always cherished: the cornerstone of the 
EU political system. Article 4 of EU Treaty
12 places the Heads of State or 
Government at a political level,
13 in the EU, above the EC institutional and 
legal system, empower them to give the EU (only) “necessary impetus” for its 
development and to “define” the general political guidelines. Regardless, the 
European Council has passed the borderline long time ago. During the 
German reunification, the European Council avoided any EC institutional 
interference in a process that should have followed the procedure of 
 
10 J. Werts: “The European Council”, North- Holland, Amsterdam, 1992, pp. 44 and 
following. 
11 See the ”Communiqué Issued After the Meeting of the Heads of State and 
Government”, Bulletin of the EC, nº 12, 1974. 
12  Literally: “The European Council shall provide the Union the necessary impetus for its 
development and shall define the general political guidelines therefore. The European 
Council shall bring together the Heads of State or of Government of the Member 
States and the President of the Commission. They shall be assisted by the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs of the Member States and the President of the Commission. The 
European Council shall meet at least twice a year, under the chairmanship of the Head 
of State of or Government of the Member State that holds the Presidency of the 
Council. The European Council shall submit to the European Parliament a report after 
each of its meetings and a yearly written report on the progress achieved by the 
Union.”  
13 Basically as its first inclusion in European Primary Law, article 2 of the Single 
European Act. 
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enlargement.
14 Furthermore, the European Council “modified” the Maastricht 
Treaty illegally
15 before it came into force, allowing Denmark to introduce 
certain opt-outs and exceptions in order to make a second ratification 
referendum feasible, since it had an uncomfortable “No” in its record. 
The European Council has a less aggressive face, which is not completely 
covered by the legal nature of Article 4 of EU Treaty. As it is well-known, the 
Presidency conclusions are, on a regular basis, the way in which the European 
Council “defines” the general political guidelines of the Union. In practice, 
one can appreciate that these conclusions are closer to a legal text than to a 
political guideline: for its precise delimitation of actions’ scope, its imperative 
wording, and eventually the inclusion of deadlines to achieve objectives. 
Thus, the EC institutions can find themselves not only with a political 
guideline, but with a concrete demand of action, and a fixed date to finish the 
given task. 
 
14  This critic position about the European Council cannot be defended here, I remit to the 
second chapter of my PhD dissertation, El sistema institucional de la Unión Europea: la 
problemática presente y futura, U.C.M., 2000, pp. 109-188. Against my position in this 
concrete aspect, C. Tomuschat: “A united Germany within the European Community”, 
Common Market Law Review, number 27, 1990, pp. 417 and following; C.W.A. 
Timmermans: “German Unification and Community Law ”, Common Market Law 
Review, number 27, 1990, pp. 439 and following. 
15  The only path in the TEU to produce such a reform was article R, that is to say, a 
reopening of the signed but not ratified Treaty for all the Member states TEU. Instead, 
the European Council, during the Summit Meeting held in Edinburgh (11-12 December 
1992), adopted the “Decision of Heads of States or Government, in the European 
Council, concerning certain problems raised by Denmark of the Treaty of the European 
Union” which in my view is simply nothing in the EC legal sources. See, Presidency 
Conclusions of the European Council held in Edinburgh, 12 and 13 December 1992, 
“Part-B-Denmark and the Treaty of the European Union”, Annex 1 to Part B: 
“Decision of Heads of States or Government, in the European Council, concerning 
certain problems raised by Denmark of the Treaty of the European Union”, Bulleting of 
the European Communities, Volume 25, number 12, 1992; also in OJ of the EC, 
number C 348, December 21st, 1992. 
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Hendrik Voss and Emilie Bailleul, analyzing this European Council dimension 
(concretely the deadlines), conclude that such a reality is another factor 
restricting the Presidency’s control on the EU agenda: 
“A President has no more impact on this ‘task’ than on the rolling programme, and 
the margin for adding a personal touch is quite narrow.”
16  
Agreeing on such a conclusion, it should be immediately added that the 
described dimension is just one side of the European Council-EU Presidency 
relationship. The Presidency holds, as in every Council, the European Council 
Presidency. There it enjoys the larger margin (more than in a legislative 
Council) to shape its meetings agenda, which is the cornerstone in shaping EU 
agenda. Furthermore, the European Council conclusions are, though agreed, 
the conclusion of the “European Council President”. In the end, the 
Presidency is the best location to generate the rolling programme that will be 
followed in the forthcoming presidencies, and that is a desirable trade-off for 
existing lack of margins provoked by previous European Council conclusions. 
Summarizing, here again, the Presidency’s advantages compensate. 
Last but not least, one should take into account the scope of action in the 
intergovernmental pillars. When, in the European Union Treaty, the CFSP and 
JHA were established as new areas for Union action, Member States opted to 
confer on the Presidency a series of tasks, which under the Community system 
would be entrusted to the Commission. The Commission’s role deteriorates in 
these fields qualitatively and quantitatively. As a result, the Presidency is 
responsible for representing the Union in CFSP matters, implementing 
common measures and expressing the Union’s position in international 
organizations and at international conferences. The Amsterdam Treaty 
embraced this role, by enabling the Council to instruct the Presidency to 
negotiate an international agreement on behalf of the Union and by entrusting 
the Presidency with the same tasks in JHA as well as in CFSP cooperation 
areas. 
 
16  Hendrik Voss and Emilie Bailleul, cit., pp. 6-7. 
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Therefore the Presidency does not need to bypass or press the Commission in 
order to get its initiatives through the EC machinery. In the intergovernmental 
pillars the manoeuvre margin is increased, since only Member States 
monopolize the agenda. In the second and third pillars, despite the EC Pillar 
when qualified majority voting governs, it is harder to approve a positive 
measure than to include it on the agenda. In the intergovernmental pillars, the 
decision-making process is governed by consensus-unanimity. As a 
consequence, Member States can afford to be less reluctant allowing the 
Presidency’s autonomy in drafting the agenda. Thus, presidencies intensify 
and concentrate their agenda priorities in those pillars. The Spanish 
Presidency has been a paragon of such a reality. 
V. Presidency  reform? 
Pro and contra 
Member States observe the Presidency as their legitimate turn to take the 
steering wheel. It is better to have the opportunity to influence the agenda 
once in a while than never. This is particularly the case for smaller countries, 
that can hardly lead a majority supporting its agenda in a normal EU daily life. 
In such a direction, though in a more diplomatic way, Mr. Aznar pronounced 
before the Spanish Congreso de los Diputados presenting the Spanish 
Presidency’s priorities: “The Presidency of the European Union settled down 
with the purpose that each Member State would have the opportunity to impel 
the politics of integration, giving their own impetus to the process and 
avoiding in this way that unbalances between the interests of the several States 
will take place.”
17 Therefore, the six-monthly rotation places the Member 
States on an equal footing, giving each of them the opportunity of influencing 
during the same period the course of Union business. In the previous section 
 
17 Comparecencia del Presidente del Gobierno en el Congreso para explicar las 
prioridades de la Presidencia Española de la UE, (10/12/2001) 
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of this paper we dealt with the Presidency’s “abuse”. Here, on the contrary, we 
are dealing with the Presidency’s “use” (normal-proportional use). 
Another well-recognized advantage comes with the necessity to connect the 
EU with its Member States. With the six-monthly rotation system each 
Member State is periodically involved in Union’s business giving members of 
the government, civil servants, national media and public opinion the 
opportunity of becoming familiar with the process of European integration. It 
should be taken into account that in national public’s opinions to hold the 
Presidency normally regenerates a positive balance in terms of popularity and 
media coverage. As it has been underlined persistently by the Spanish media 
and political opposition: a Presidency can never go wrong for the 
Government. Here Member States find another reason to promote the status 
quo.  
Furthermore, the system generates an impetus that concentrates the energies of 
each successive Presidency and thus provides the essential drive for making 
progress and achieving results. Certainly, the need to take advantage of a six-
monthly turn foment a constant sum of partial impulses that globally generate 
a steady impetus, which pushes forward the EU agenda in the medium-term. 
Lastly, it enables policies to be more consistent as a result of single political 
control over the whole Community machine. This undeniable advantage in 
highly complex political systems finds itself hindered by the term limitation 
and the Council interaction with other institutions. From a reform viewpoint, 
to break the single Presidency has shown to be a key and a boundary. 
At this stage we should discuss the operational disadvantages. Firstly, it 
should be noticed that a six-monthly rotation represents a major handicap for 
the continuity of the Council’s work, particularly for the committees and 
working parties. The examination of specific topics frequently stretches over a 
longer period than six months and demands a technical expertise, which can 
only be acquired with sufficient time. In addition, the Council is confronted 
with institutions that are more permanent than itself: both the European 
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Parliament and the Commission have five-year mandates and their members 
work full-time for the Union. Besides the mandates continuity, there is another 
comparative disadvantage with other institutions, namely its competence: 
whereas the Council Presidency splits up into numerous specialist 
components, the EP and the Commission enjoy a horizontal distribution in 
their sphere of competence. 
As well as the limited Presidency period can generate a general impetus 
beneficial for the EU as a whole, the pressure of having to take stock at the 
end of each six-monthly period sometimes causes a rush. Such a celerity can 
lead to the adoption of makeshift decisions or a proliferation of badly drafted 
or non-compulsory acts (resolutions, conclusions) when the Union’s interests 
would have been better served by the adoption of a more binding act that, in 
turn, would have required more lengthy negotiations stretching over several 
Presidencies and on a high level of compatibility between national and EU 
agendas. 
All these negative aspects that currently influence EU life (particularly on the 
Council level) demand certain concerns about the convenience to retain the 
principle of a six-monthly rotating Presidency for all the Council’s preparatory 
bodies within an enlarged and increasingly complex Union. This forthcoming 
scenario might on the one hand lead to serious difficulties for the efficiency 
and continuity of the Council’s work. On the other hand, it will increase the 
workload to an overwhelming extent for some Member States, particularly for 
future Member States whose administrations have no experience of the 
Community machinery and are relatively undeveloped. 
In the external representative dimension attached to the Presidency, there is 
little room for optimism. The rotating Presidency tends to blur the outside 
world’s image of the Union by impairing the visibility and effectiveness of its 
external representation, particularly in CFSP matters, for which the Treaty has 
conferred major responsibilities on the Presidency. Deepening in the daily life 
of the described reality it seems to arise a positive externally: the protagonism 
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of Mr. PESC who, so far, has found the way to enhance its representative role 
as the link among presidencies. 
Lastly, I should refer once again to the Presidency’s “abuse”, already analyzed 
in detail (see above). The best confirmation of the power that the Presidency 
grants to the Member State in office, and of the general agreement to “share 
the cake”, is the everlasting resistance to introduce changes in the institution. 
This fact, in its last evolution, should be analyzed together with the 
intergovernmental front currently composed of old and new elements. Among 
the first elements, the unstoppable protagonism of the European Council. 
Among the new elements, which appeared after Delors left the Commission to 
reduce the great power of the executive, can be underlined: the creation of the 
High Representative, the Agencies, the talks about Mr. Euro or the current 
rumors about a “President” for the Union. Once we underlined the context, let 
us focus in the last failed attempts to reform the institution. 
The last serious attempt to change the Presidency came with the pre-Nice 
Intergovernmental Conference and will last, at least, until the 2004 IGC, 
particularly through proposals specifically addressing the Council reform. Let 
us summarize, from a critical perspective, the main contributions before and 
during the Spanish Presidency. This exercise will help us consider the 
necessity of a change in the institution. 
The Trumpf/Piris Report 
The European Council of Vienna, with a view to the future enlargement and 
on the basis of the informal debates celebrated in October in Pörtschach, 
dedicated point IX of its conclusions to “Improving the Functioning of the 
Institutions”. There, the Heads of State or Government  
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“note with satisfaction that the report from the Secretary-General on the 
functioning of the Council in the perspective of an enlarged Union will be 
presented at the beginning of 1999.”
18 
This report, presented in March of 1999, was carried out under the supervision 
of Mr. Jürgen Trumpf,
19 at the time, Council Secretary General. Their 
objective was to assist the Council by abstracting the necessary conclusions in 
order to confront the institutional reform foreseen in Amsterdam and forced by 
the agreed enlargement. Maybe, because of being the testament of the last 
bureaucrat that occupied the office, in the face of the imminent arrival of Mr. 
PESC, the report shows a sufficient dose of technical knowledge and not so 
much daring. Explicitly was consecrated to those reforms that did not demand 
Primary Law modification, which should be located as accompaniment 
measures for the Nice and 2004 Intergovernmental Conferences. Among the 
avenues to be explored, the Trumpf/Piris report proposed the following:
20 
VI.  Improving the transition between Presidencies 
In appropriate sectors, set up work programmes stretching over two six-month 
periods or more (beyond the Presidency) and in general provide for closer 
cooperation between the incumbent Presidency and the one(s) following. For 
instance, allowing the next Presidency to chair working parties preparing for 
 
18  Presidency Conclusions of the Vienna European Council, 11 and 12 December 1998, 
point 81. European Council Presidency Conclusions are available in all the EU official 
languages at Europe wed page, http://ue.eu.int/es/Info/eurocouncil/index.htm. 
19  Operation of the Council with an Enlarged Union in Prospect - Report by the Working 
Party set up by the Secretary-General of the Council (´Trumpf/Piris Report´), Brussels, 
10-03-1999, number 2139/99. 
20 All the propositions here summarized and comments can be found in the Part II, 
Chapter 11: The Presidency of the Trumpf/Piris Report. 
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meetings of certain Councils to be held at the beginning of that next 
Presidency (in accordance with the existing Rules of Procedure).
21 
VII.  Asking the Member States exercising the 
Presidency to provide the necessary means, 
particularly, personal means 
22 
It proposes to ensure the greater availability of those chairing committees and 
working parties, by avoiding, as a general rule, a situation where one person 
has to chair several working parties or committees with a large workload, in 
order to facilitate contacts with the General Secretariat, Commission, 
European Parliament and delegations between meetings.  
In order to avoid the “delegation gaps” and its negative repercussion in the 
decision-making process technique and timing,
23 it is proposed to endeavor to 
second the people, who will be chairing committees and working parties with 
a heavy workload to the Permanent Representations in Brussels, not only for 
the six months of the Presidency but also, if possible, during the preceding 
months so that they can already take part in the proceedings of the committees 
or working parties for a reasonable period, to familiarize themselves with the 
matters in hand and with the other members and the operating procedures. 
Also to ensure that those chairing committees and working parties are 
adequately trained and have prior experience, particularly with regard to the 
Council’s decision-making procedures and working methods.
 
21  Concretely, during the months of May-June and November-December. Remember that 
currently, by that time, the forthcoming Presidency has normally articulated its 
Presidency guidelines. 
22  One should not forget that presidencies are held by national administrations and the 
Member State permanent representation in Brussels. 
23  Problem that, as we have noticed before affects also to every delegation, especially at 
working parties, though eventually Coreper. Even in the Council the representative has 
not more option than to let the dossier pass until the European Council will take it on 
board. 
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From a most administrative-political perspective,
24 it is suggested to ensure, 
particularly during the Presidency, the best possible allocation of 
responsibilities between the capital and the Permanent Representation in 
Brussels. The latter is closer to the other delegations and the Commission and 
is better placed to understand their positions and rapidly point the Council in 
the right direction. It should have as much room for manoeuvre as possible. 
Give a Presidency official sufficient authority to plan working party meetings 
in close cooperation with colleagues from the “Antici” and “Mertens” Groups 
and with the General Secretariat of the Council. 
VIII.  Developing the Presidency’s external support 
mechanisms 
Establishing, for instance, the formal office of Vice-president for each Council 
formation with responsibility for relieving the President of the Council of 
certain representational duties (relations with other institutions, chairing 
committees set up under cooperation and association agreements etc.), helping 
the President to find compromise solutions and acting as a replacement should 
the President be unavailable. The Vice-president could be either the Minister 
of the Member State due to hold the next Presidency or be chosen by the 
Council from among its members (excluding the Minister of the Member State 
holding the Presidency) for a period of two or three years. Introducing a 
degree of continuity in the Presidency by spreading more equally tasks, which 
become too onerous for a single Member State. 
 
24  One should take into account that the administrative logic supporting this suggestion, 
underlying the qualities of the Permanent Representation in Brussels, forgets that this 
Permanent Representation depends on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while the 
Working Parties delegations rest normally on the “capital” headquarters, but on other 
Ministries. Consequently, especially in national governments held by parties coalition, 
hostilities to relocated competencies in the Permanent Representations from capitals 
will remain high.  
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In this specific and transcendental field, the Report moves between the need of 
changes and the need to preserve national interest at stake, let say: in the 
border of self-contradiction. So, it is considered that changes could be made to 
the practice of extending the rotation system to every one of the 250 or so 
committees and working parties, in order to achieve greater continuity of work 
and a more rational allocation of tasks; and at the same time, they consider it 
necessary to preserve the political impetus given by the rotating Presidency, 
that is with due regard to the Treaty rules on the six-monthly rotation of the 
Council Presidency.  
Entrust the chairmanship of certain temporary working parties dealing with a 
specific subject covered by a well-defined political brief to a person appointed 
for the time it takes to complete the work. In the area of the CFSP: appoint the 
future Secretary-General/High Representative for the CFSP to the chair of the 
Political Committee; appoint a senior official in the General Secretariat to 
chair any permanent body (for example the Political Committee at deputy 
level) responsible for monitoring the day-to-day implementation of Council 
decisions; appoint General Secretariat officials to chair the European 
Correspondents’ Group and the Policy Planning Working Party; give the chair 
of certain geographic working parties to any “special envoys” that there may 
be. 
In general, consider the possibility of giving the chair of committees and 
working parties to persons elected by their peers for a period of two or three 
years with due regard to geographical balance (under Coreper supervision). 
However (here comes the need for preserving national interest, which appears 
in a mixture with the positive side of the current system), to avoid 
fragmentation, which would dilute the political authority of the incumbent 
Presidency: the six-monthly rotating Council Presidency would retain political 
responsibility for and control over the organization of work (timetable, 
agendas, etc.); six-monthly rotation would be retained for all the Council’s 
preparatory bodies based in Brussels which act as feeders to the political level 
or which play a vital part in the coordination of work (Coreper I and II, SCA, 
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Friends of the Presidency, etc.); each person elected (or appointed 
permanently) to chair a working party would be assisted by a deputy 
representing the rotating Council Presidency, in order to ensure the overall 
coordination of work in the light of the Presidency’s political priorities. 
In addition to the latest dimension comes the monopoly of the chairmanship. 
For the Council’s preparatory bodies, the chairmanship of which would 
remain subject to six-monthly rotation, establishes the office of Vice-
Chairman (to be chosen among the members but excluding the member from 
the Member State holding the Presidency); this function of Vice-Chairman 
would be particularly useful in the case of Coreper I as a means of dealing 
with the growing obligations arising under the co-decision procedure. 
The Finish Presidency: An effective Council for an enlarged Union. 
The Finish Presidency, after the command of the European Council of Colony, 
assumed the challenge of pushing forward the proposals for the Council 
reform. Being the only new Member State directly involved in the Nice IGC, 
it showed the audacity frequently taken of the hand of ignorance. Ignorance 
not about the processes but in regard to the actors involved. Those of us who 
lived the first Finish Presidency in Brussels did not stop being surprised by 
their perplexity in the face of the community reality: it is not a question of 
proposing the best solution to solve the problems, it is many times about 
proposing acceptable solutions. 
With the mentioned spirit the Finish Presidency carried out two proposals. 
These contributions are to our understanding essential in order to understand 
the problem at stake. The first, “An effective Council for an enlarged Union”, 
was linked to the possible internal reformation of the Council without 
demanding a Primary Law reform. The second, the report “Efficient 
Institutions after the Enlargement”, approached the IGC debate, as much for 
their content as for their vocation to be part of the Nice Treaty. 
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The cited contributions to the CIG was unequal luck. The guidelines for the 
reformation of the Council, “An effective Council for an enlarged Union” 
(object of this study), were, in their last version, approved by the European 
Council of Helsinki, though without implementation until the Spanish 
Presidency. Its second contribution, “Efficient Institutions after the 
Enlargement” (which does not demand our attention), had little final 
repercussion. The IGC left more of its key proposals aside: due to the 
partiality of certain proposals, orientated to please the small Member States; as 
well as for the lack of political support in the most progressive ones. 
The Finish Presidency’s approach to the internal reform of the Council shared 
the same rationale as the Trumpf report, that is: the negative repercussions of 
the enlargement together with current deficiencies of the Council are too deep 
to be solved only with a Primary Law reform. They demand a global reform. 
Despite of the capability to carry out a deep reformation of the power 
allotment in the Council, the institution demands a revolution in its internal 
organization.  
The first project of report presented in November of 1999
25 met in the Coreper 
II with those who take the decisions and the report suffered the first reduction 
of contents. These reductions gave birth to the report project dated on 
December 3, 1999.
26 This report faced the General Affairs Council preparatory 
of the Helsinki European Council (December 1999), held in Brussels this 
month. There the Spanish Secretary of State for European Affairs, Mr. Ramón 
de Miguel Egea, carried out an allegation of the traditional States rights, which 
are radically opposed to any new spirit needed in any deep change in Council 
working methods. Its intervention, with the explicit support of their 
 
25  Un Consejo eficaz para una Unión ampliada-proyecto de informe- directrices para la 
reforma y recomendaciones operativas, 22 –11-1999 (26.11) (OR. en) SN 3678/99. 
From now on cited as Un Consejo eficaz I. 
26  Un Consejo eficaz para una Unión ampliada-proyecto de informe- directrices para la 
reforma y recomendaciones operativas, 3-12-1999 (OR. en) 13635/99 LIMITE 
POLGEN 3. From now on cited as Un Consejo eficaz II. 
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Portuguese counterpart (for that time future and competent Presidency in order 
to activate the IGC), impeded to reach a consensus on the report’s general 
guidelines to Helsinki. According to Spanish Secretary of State his delegation 
could just “ take note of the report”. 
The mentioned Council provoked the last and deeper report cut before the 
final version approved by the European Council of Helsinki.
27 In Helsinki, the 
Head of State and Government, though recognizing that “it is necessary to 
introduce deep changes in the Council’s working methods” eliminated the 
better substance in relation with the reform of the Presidency opting for 
approving some toned down operative recommendations.
28 In the forthcoming, 
I will analyze the approved report in relation with our interest topic, pointing 
out those significant proposals not considered or eliminated. Certainly, the 
methodology of draft comparison serves our interest by noticing also the 
explored roads. 
Going into the concrete reforms of the Council Presidency, the Finish 
Presidency shared the analytical picture offered in the Trumpf report. With the 
course of the years the Council work has increased considerably and will 
continue to increase when the enlargement takes place. In the face of such 
reality the Finish Presidency took the path of taking advantage of the diverse 
forms of support available with a view to facilitate the work of the Presidency. 
For instance the future Presidency and the Troika. It is also assumed that the 
reality of the growing number of the Council members and the increment of 
 
27 Un Consejo eficaz para una Unión ampliada-directrices para la reforma y 
recomendaciones operativas, included in annex III of the Presidency Conclusion of the 
Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 December 1999. From now on cited as Un 
Consejo eficaz III. 
28  “Es preciso introducir cambios sustanciales en los métodos de trabajo del Consejo y 
ello debe hacerse de modo gradual desde ahora para que, en el momento de la 
ampliación, el Consejo pueda adaptarse sin contratiempos al aumento del número de 
Estados miembros. El Consejo Europeo ha aprobado las recomendaciones operativas 
que figuran en el Anexo III”(Emphasis added). See point 20 of the Presidency 
Conclusion of the Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 December 1999. 
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the Presidency’s responsibilities, will require an adult and clearer support to 
the Council and to the Presidency on the part of the General Secretary. 
The report finally approved in Helsinki did not leave rake of the most 
innovative proposals. The initial report started from the appropriate premise: 
the work saturation and the Presidency’s “abuse” are problems that cannot be 
solved with good intentions of collaboration. Starting from the reality of the 
Presidency’s monopoly, it was proposed to convert the future Presidency into 
a Vice-presidency:  
“the future Presidency will act like Vice-presidency in order to support the 
Presidency [...]. The Vice-presidency tasks, which will be realized following 
instructions of the incumbent Presidency, will be to substitute the Presidency in 
the form and in the moment in which it is necessary, assist it in their 
administrative work and reinforce the continuity of the work of the Council. The 
Presidency and the Vice-presidency will adopt the necessary measures in order to 
guarantee an appropriate transition from a Presidency to the following”.
29 
The proposal did not only aim to share tasks, but to further “democratization 
and transparency” of the transition between presidencies. Because of the Vice-
presidency involvement in the last period of the incumbent Presidency term, 
the monopoly exercised for the latter will be reduced and the transition 
facilitated. Moreover, the potentialities of a co-Presidency, in punctual and/or 
important questions like an IGC, should be considered. The mention to the 
“future Presidency” finally carried out, instead of the Vice-presidency, will 
give rise to nothing innovative. Like those Member States that rejected the 
well-known formula, only the Vice-presidency, by having recognition and 
juridical status in the incumbent Presidency semester, would influence in a 
real change. On the contrary, to continue referring to the future Presidency 
signifies that everything remains the same. 
The proposal, with the same logic and luck, was extended to the different 
levels of the Council. Thus, it was considered that the Coreper could decide to 
 
29  Un Consejo eficaz I, G. LA PRESIDENCIA DEL CONSEJO, point 23. 
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name a person, who would preside a Working Group or a Specialized 
Committee during the period dedicated to a concrete file or a proposal. Also 
when it would be justified for other reasons, always during a fixed period. 
Equally, it was proposed to enlarge the period, in which the person entrusted 
of presiding over a Group or a specialized committee could continue carrying 
out that function. This proposal was linked to the Vice-presidency: “in such 
cases, the function of the person entrusted of the Vice-presidency of the Group 
or of the specialized committee in question will carry out the representative of 
the Presidency of the Council”. The objective of such a revolutionary measure 
would be to avoid that the incoming Presidency capable of pushing aside 
certain topics considered as priority matters by the majority, for its particular 
interest in the paralysis or delay for adopting the act. 
The paralyzing mentality with relationship to the Presidency affected to most 
important qualitative jumps, and not exclusively to the reduction of the 
Presidency monopoly. In fact, it also affected aspects addressing the 
reinforcement of the institution. In the context of the necessary improvement 
of the legislative function of the Council, the possibility of using the 
Presidency as a link during the period in which a proposal continues alive, or 
as a springboard to reopen delicate files in the future (or files blocked by a 
minority) was rejected.  
Concretely it was proposed that  
“in absence of legislative proposal, or in intermediate phases of the negotiation 
surrounding a proposal, the results of a debate of the Council should, as a general 
rule, remain reflected in some ‘Presidency conclusions’ of a simple character and 
not negotiated previously. The Council will abstain of adopting resolutions, 
declarations or any another form of not normalized act”.
30  
In Helsinki, rejecting such a proposal, the Member States affirmed their 
intention of continuing paralyzing the legislative procedure. With the 
approved measures, the Presidency continued being incapable to filter the 
 
30  Ibid., D. la función legislativa del consejo, point 14. 
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interest of a single State. The State would continue being capable of 
maintaining alive the most marginal of the positions independently of its 
foregoing success and the negative repercussions of the declaration in the 
whole process.
31 
The Spanish Presidency and the reform of the Presidency 
The last Report of the Finish Presidency was approved by the Helsinki 
European Council in December 1999. However, until the Spanish Presidency, 
those measures were not fully implemented. Thus, the Seville European 
Council 
“gave a reminder of the importance which it attached to the effective 
implementation of all the guidelines and operational recommendations adopted by 
the Helsinki European Council”.
32  
Although this first agreed step in the Council reform process was not yet 
implemented, some new steps were taken, particularly during the Swedish 
Presidency in the context of the so-called “Modernizing Institutions” chapter. 
The Göteborg European Council received a new Report of the Council 
Secretary General.
33 The Report evidenced that additional (to those adopted in 
Helsinki) reforms of the Council’s structures and working methods are 
necessary. The European Council took on board that necessity and requested 
the General Secretary to present “detailed suggestions for further actions to 
ensure an effective Council, based on a better preparation of the Council 
meetings, effective coordination between different council formations and 
more effective working methods.”
34  
 
31  See the version definitively approved: Un Consejo eficaz I, D. la función legislativa del 
consejo, points 15 y 16. 
32  Presidency Conclusions of the Seville European Council, 21 and 22 June, 2002, point 
6. 
33  “Preparing the Council for the Enlargement”, Council Doc. 9518/01 + ADD 1 REV 1. 
34  Presidency Conclusions of the Göteborg European Council, 15 and 16 June 1999, point 
17. 
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As a result of the Göteborg European Council mandate, the General Secretary 
elaborated another Report (“Preparing the Council for the Enlargement”),
35 
which was finally addressed to the Barcelona European Council. In its 
consideration about the Presidency reform, the General Secretary proposed 
two “possibilities for discussion”: reforms that following the Helsinki strategy 
will not demand Treaties’ amendments; and, on the other hand, formulae 
requiring amendment of the Treaties. The formulae applicable without 
amendment of the Treaties recuperated some of the possibilities explored in 
the first Finish reports. For instance to improve cooperation between 
successive Presidencies by forwarding longer scheduling of meetings, opening 
ways for creating functions for subsequent Presidencies. Also exploring ways 
to break the monopoly in those presidencies not regulated by the Treaties: 
appointing the chairmen of certain working parties or committees for a period 
longer than 6 months; giving the General Secretariat of the Council the chair 
of certain specific committees or working parties. 
As far as the formulae applicable requiring amendment of the Treaties are 
concerned, the opposite logic was followed, namely to focus on those 
presidencies regulated in the Treaties. In relation with the European Council 
Presidency, it was proposed to discuss the possibility of electing the President 
by its members for a term of over 6 months. In relation with the other Council 
Formations, the same term extension was proposed (for some Councils or all), 
opening two possibilities for the President’s appointment: by election or on 
the basis of a rotation between five or six groups of States which would hold 
the Presidency concurrently. 
The Barcelona European Council, after hearing the report’s presentation by 
the Secretary-General,  
“instructed the Presidency, in close cooperation with the Council Secretary-
General, to make all appropriate contacts on that basis with the members of the 
 
35 “Preparing the Council for the Enlargement (Report by the Secretary-General)”, 
Brussels, 11 March 2002. 
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European Council […], with a view to submitting a report at the Seville meeting 
proposing specific measures for adoption”.
36  
The Presidency jointly with the General Secretariat of the Council presented 
its report titled “Measures to prepare the Council for the Enlargement”.
37  
The report followed the twofold approach to the Presidency’s reform 
depending on the necessity of Primary Law modification, though emphasizing 
that part of the Member States were not in favor of a deep reform of the 
institution, at least to the extent of modifying the Treaties. In relation with the 
proposed modifications requiring amendment of the Treaties, this report, 
added two points to those included in the report elaborated by General 
Secretary (previously referred to).
38 One, granting the possibility to take ad 
hoc solutions,
39 independently of the general formula adopted (collective 
Presidency, elected, etc.). This approach would be valid for concrete cases, 
particularly for specialized committees (article 133, employment, in the JHA 
field) and for formations in the external relations and ESDP field (Council, 
Political and Security Committee, working parties). Secondly,
40 the possibility 
to maintain (whatever the general system is decided upon) at least some 
elements based on the six-monthly rotation. The following cases are 
mentioned: the Council’s “backbone” (European Council, General Affairs 
 
36  Presidency Conclusions of the Barcelona European Council, 15 and 16 March 2002, 
point 51. 
37  “Measures to prepare the Council for Enlargement, Report by the Presidency to the 
European Council (drawn up jointly with the General Secretariat of the Council)”, 
Brussels, 13 June 2002, Council Doc. 9339/02. 
38  “Preparing the Council for the Enlargement (Report by the Secretary-General)”, cit., 
point III. 
39  “Measures to prepare the Council for Enlargement, Report by the Presidency to the 
European Council (drawn up jointly with the General Secretariat of the Council)”, cit., 
point II. 1.2. 
40  “Measures to prepare the Council for Enlargement, Report by the Presidency to the 
European Council (drawn up jointly with the General Secretariat of the Council)”, cit., 
point II. 1.3. 
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Council and Representatives Committee), informal Presidency meetings, and 
Vice-presidencies in some areas. 
Despite Spanish Presidency interest, due to the disagreement between Member 
States, the Seville European Council did not take any positive decision. Like 
the Presidency report reflected, the great majority of the delegations believe 
that the current system will not be able to function in an enlarged Union and 
that maintaining this system will have negative consequences on the 
functioning of the Council. However, 
“according to some other Member States, it has not been objectively proven that 
maintaining the current system without any amendment would pose difficulties”.
41  
Due to such a divergence between Member States, more time was needed in 
order to reach an agreement for the reform of the Presidency, particularly on 
breaking the six-monthly rotation in every level, as well as for modifying the 
Treaties to affect the Council’s “backbone”. Finally, the Seville European 
Council 
“asked the future Danish Presidency to take appropriate steps to continuous 
discussion with a view to an initial report to the European Council in December 
2002”.
42 
 
41  Ibid., point II. 2, p. 7. 
42  Presidency Conclusions of the Seville European Council, 21 and 22 June, 2002, point 
5. Actually this point refers to a concrete report on the reform of the Presidency. It 
should be noticed that, although point II of the “Measures to prepare the Council for 
Enlargement, Report by the Presidency to the European Council (drawn up jointly with 
the General Secretariat of the Council)”, was dedicated to the reform of the Presidency, 
the Spanish Presidency also worked in a specific report on the Presidency reform. This 
report being object of important disagreements on the same explained ground, was not 
attached to the Seville European Council (see the “List of supporting reports for the 
European Council”, annex VIII of the Conclusions) but was addressed to it. The 
European Council simply took note of the report and realized the cited address to the 
Danish Presidency.  
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On the contrary, some modifications drawn up in the Presidency report, which 
do not require amendment of the Treaties,
43 were approved in the Seville 
European Council,
44 concretely within the “Measures Concerning the 
Structure and Functioning of the Council”.
45 Within the specific measures 
relating to the Presidency, two aspects were developed. On the one hand, the 
chairing of certain working parties by the General Secretariat of the Council.
46 
From this point, in addition to the working parties where the General 
Secretariat already acts as a chairman, the following should be added: 
Working Party on Electronic Communications, Working Party on Legal 
information, Working Party on Codification of Legislation, Working Party on 
Information, and Working Party on New Buildings. 
The cooperation between presidencies was the second field that considered the 
specific measures relating to the Presidency. The Presidency’s monopoly will 
be broken when it is clear that a dossier will be dealt with during the next six-
months period. In these cases, a representative of the next Presidency will 
chair the working parties and the meetings. This new measure will be valid for 
any meeting other than Coreper. A second potential limitation is that 
 
43 See them in “Measures to prepare the Council for Enlargement, Report by the 
Presidency to the European Council (drawn up jointly with the General Secretariat of 
the Council)”, cit., point I. 1, pp. 6-7. 
44  “In the light of a summary, accompanied by detailed proposals, submitted in Seville by 
the Presidency, the European Council held a detailed discussion and gave its agreement 
to a series of specific measures applicable, without amendment of the Treaties, to the 
organization and functioning of the European Council (see Annex I) and the Council 
(see Annex II).” Presidency Conclusions of the Seville European Council, 21 and 22 
June 2002, point 5. I will not deal here with the measures adopted in relation with the 
European Council (Annex I, “Rules for Organizing the Proceedings of the European 
Council”) since they do not affect the Presidency structure or functioning. 
45  “Measures Concerning the Structure and Functioning of the Council”, Annex II of the 
Presidency Conclusions of the Seville European Council, 21 and 22 June 2002. 
46  Ibid., point 9. 
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“the practical implementation of this provision shall be the subject of an 
agreement between the two presidencies concerned”.
47  
The two presidencies concerned could also apply this arrangement to the 
chairing of the Council meetings at the time when the items in question are 
discussed.
48 Lastly, for the preparation of the meetings of the Council 
configurations meeting once every six months, where such meetings are held 
during the first half of the six month period, working parties and the meetings 
(other that Coreper) taking place during the previous Presidency, shall be 
chaired by a delegate of the Member State, which will chair the Council 
meetings in question.
49 
Apart from the specific measures relating to the Presidency, in concrete under 
the measures dedicated to achieve a better programming of the Council 
activities, certain measures have been taken that will affect the Presidency. 
They will reduce the monopoly enjoyed by the incumbent Presidency in 
drafting the agenda and will facilitate the linking between consecutive 
presidencies. From this stage, a Presidency agenda will be defined by a 
“multiannual strategic programme” and an “annual operating programme of 
the Council activities”. 
The “multiannual strategic programme” lasts 3 years and will be adopted in 
the following manner.
50 First, the new General Affairs Council will make a 
recommendation to the presidencies involved, 9 Member States out of 30 in an 
enlarged Europe.
51 Secondly, the presidencies concerned, after consulting the 
Commission, will draw up a joint proposal that will be addressed to the 
European Council. Finally, the European Council, supposedly within the role 
conferred to it by article 4 of EU Treaty (to define general political 
 
47  Ibid., point 7, 1st paragraph. 
48  Ibid., point 7, 2nd paragraph. 
49  Ibid., point 8. 
50  Ibid., point 4.  
51  This recommendation will not make much sense in current circumstances, where the 
GAC will be dominated by the Member States affected by the GAC’s recommendation. 
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guidelines), will adopt the “multiannual strategic programme”. The first 
programme will be adopted in December 2003. 
The “annual operating programme of the Council activities” is a yearly 
concretion of the “multiannual strategic programme” and due to that it is taken 
in its light.
52 Firstly, an initial draft programme will be proposed jointly for the 
two presidencies involved in the coming year. In elaborating this programme, 
the two presidencies in line shall take regard, inter alia, to relevant points 
arising from the dialogue on the political priorities for the year conducted at 
the Commission’s initiative. Secondly, the presidencies will submit the 
programme to the General Affairs Council of December where it will be 
discussed. Thirdly, a final version of the programme shall be drawn up by the 
involved presidencies on the basis of the General Affairs Council’s 
discussions.  
This final “annual operating programme of the Council activities” will be 
accompanied by a “list of indicative agendas” for the various Council 
configurations for the first six months of the year. So, though nothing is 
specifically said about the authorship of this first term’s “list of indicative 
agendas”, certain factors indicate that the list elaboration should be done in 
coordination with both presidencies. These factors are the spirit of the 
measures, the event that comes together with the “annual operating 
programme of the Council activities” and the reference made in the second 
term’s list (see below). For the second half of the coming year the same list 
should be submitted by the Presidency concerned before July, the 1
st. In doing 
so the Presidency concerned shall act “following the appropriate consultation, 
in particular with the following Presidency.”
53  
Summarizing and concluding, if one takes into account the considerations 
realized about the negative influence that the Presidency monopoly has in the 
EU agenda, the reforms included in the “Measures to prepare the Council for 
 
52  “Measures Concerning the Structure and Functioning of the Council”, cit., point 5. 
53  Ibid., point 6. 
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the Enlargement” (adopted by the Seville European Council) take their full 
dimension. They narrow down the capacity of “abusing” the Presidency by a 
single Member State. Even more significant, they introduce a more federal-
democratic logic within the Council. I am not speaking about introducing a 
more federal-democratic logic within the EU agenda, since a significant 
contribution of the European Parliament in this field is not even formalized. In 
relation with the Commission, at least at first hand, it seems that its legislative 
initiative and particularly the margin enjoyed when drafting the Annual 
Legislative Programmes will be negatively affected. It should also be taken 
into account that the European Council is clearly reinforced, having a closer 
influence on the EC legislative making process when adopting the 
“multiannual strategic programme”. The interpretation given by the Seville 
decision places almost no limits to the term “general political guidelines” 
indicated in article 4 of the EU Treaty.  
However, taking into account the previous scenario, the fact that more States 
(the number depends on the procedural stage) will take part in drafting the 
agenda, is a democratic plus in the Council’s decision-making. This will have 
a direct positive efficiency output, which always comes together with the 
institution legitimacy. In logic, the coordination between the 9 Member States 
involved and the previous consensus in the General Affairs Council in 
defining the agenda, will give a greater guarantee for its implementation. The 
“multiannual strategic programme” involves drafting the agenda the same 
States normally implicated in implementing the drafted items. It is well-known 
that six months is not enough to include a topic on the agenda and to reach the 
approval of a legislative measure, but three years (the time taken by the 
“multiannual strategic programme”) is more than enough to realize such a 
process, particularly when transitions and connections between presidencies 
are improved, like it is the case with the “annual operating programme” and 
the “list of indicative agendas”. 
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X.  The agenda of the Spanish Presidency 
The Spanish Presidency, from the very beginning, in the official guidelines 
document, as well as in several political speeches,
54 established six fields of 
priorities: combating terrorism in an area of freedom, security, and justice; 
success introducing the Euro; impetus of the Lisbon Process at the Barcelona 
European Council: a more prosperous, dynamic Europe at the service of 
citizens; European Union enlargement; external relations: More Europe in the 
world; debate on the future of Europe. 
Combating terrorism in an area of freedom, security, and justice 
Spain is currently at one year from local and regional elections. In the 
preliminaries of the event, the most discussed theme is the convenience 
(possibility) that the two main national parties (People Party and Socialist 
Party)
55 will present a joint list in the Basque Country local election.
56 This 
reality, impossible to understand if one attends exclusively to the ideological 
cleavages of both parties, can turn perfectly coherent if one introduces 
terrorism in the picture. More than a thousand murders within the ETA 
curriculum speak for themselves: soldiers, policemen, university professors, 
children, etc., and lately a representative of non-nationalist parties in the 
Basque Country. 
After 25 years of democracy one does not need much discourse to realize that 
terrorists reject democratic forums, and that Spanish Government and citizens 
cannot solve the problem on their own. Both realities remain, at least until a 
 
54  As an illustration see Comparecencia del Presidente del Gobierno en el Congreso de 
los Diputados para explicar las prioridades de la Presidencia Española de la UE, 10-12-
2001. 
55  Both part of their respective International and European party families, moreover of 
their respective EP parliamentary groups. 
56 Regional pull will not take place in the Basque Country as in other Comunidades 
Autonomas since they have different timing from the very beginning of their 
constituency. 
  36The Spanish Presidency – Buying more than it can choose? 
certain extent, because the terrorist problem has also been an European 
problem. For instance, excuses before hand for being politically incorrect, 
some EU states (for instance France) have supported ETA terrorism in an 
active or passive way in order to gain political or economic profit. Others (for 
instance Belgium) did maintain a legal framework that allowed judges to treat 
terrorists (with a criminal record) as political refugees, therefore placing the 
Spanish democratic rule of law at the level of Pinochet’s Chile. The money 
laundry, facilitated by certain banking systems, did not help much either. 
Since Spain joined the common European house, developments in this field 
were as slow as possible for Spanish interest: until September 11, terrorism 
never was an EU priority issue. Since then, it has been at the top of the 
agenda, certainly more for the interest of the United States than for the 
Spanish. The Belgium Presidency, being shocked by the course of the events, 
had to take the challenge and to lay the foundation for the basis of a new EU 
architecture in the struggle against terrorism. The Spanish Presidency, despite 
Belgium’s conquers, did everything in its power to maintain the starting 
objectives,
57 to keep the topic at the highest point of the agenda,
58 and lately, 
to positively fill in the gaps of the architecture previously designed, taking 
particular attention to those aspects sensitive to their interest. 
 
57  Defined in: the Declaration that the Head of State and Government forty-eight hours 
after the terrorist attacks of September 11; and the Plant to combat terrorism drawn up 
by the extraordinary European Council of 21 September 2001; the Agreement reached 
in the Laeken European Council. Outside the EU arena, the United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1372/2002. 
58 The Spanish Presidency has literally held along all its Presidency and after that 
“terrorism [is] the principal and most immediate threat for the European building 
process, its values and future outlining, furthermore one of the main worries of 
European citizens.” See Conclusiones del Gobierno español sobre la Presidencia de la 
Union Europea, point II, a). 
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XI.  Strengthening the instruments of the rule of law 
throughout the Union 
A good example of the cited undesirable gaps is the existence of the so-called 
“terrorist sanctuaries”,
59 which, in Spanish view, existed in Belgium. In order 
to eliminate them, the front “Strengthening the instruments of the rule of law 
throughout the Union” was designed. There the following framework 
decisions were taken: on the Fight Against Terrorism, which included a 
common definition of terrorism and a beginning of penalties harmonization; 
on Goods Seize and Evidences Securing; on Euro-order, which substitutes the 
old extradition system. Seven Member States (Belgium, France, Luxembourg, 
Portugal, United Kingdom, Germany and Spain) have already agreed that the 
Euro-order will come into force by the 1
st semester of 2003. Together with 
these four framework decisions, Eurojust has been formally set up. Lastly, 
among the failures, one should regard the Decision for the Application of 
Specific Measures of Judicial and Political Cooperation to the terrorist 
organizations (included those in the European List of Terrorist Groups, 
approved during the Belgium Presidency). Since no legal act was taken, the 
Spanish Presidency reached a political agreement to enact such a decision in 
the near future. 
With all these measures, the Spanish Presidency considers that the prosecuted 
enhanced European Rule of Law has been reached, particularly because ETA 
will be considered a terrorist organization in every country. Thus, it will be 
more difficult to allege, before a Court, “political crimes” (instead of “terrorist 
 
59  “More Europe”, cit., point 1.1. 
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murders”) or pointing out Spain as a “suspect democracy”
60 in order to avoid 
the judging of terrorists. 
XII.  Greater cooperation between security bodies of the 
Member States 
As States have national jurisdictions, criminality does not. In other words, the 
police arm finds in national borders operational limitations, terrorism takes 
advantage of this situation to settle logistic and supportive means beyond 
borders. That has been the historical case of ETA and Grapo in France or IRA 
in Ireland.  
Suffering this reality, the Spanish Presidency tried to reduce terrorists scope to 
take advantage of the existing variety of security bodies through fomenting 
preventive and operational cooperation. Among the outputs worth to be 
emphasized is the amplification of the Europol Convention, in concrete the 
authorization to create Investigation Working Teams; creating the faculty to 
request the aperture of investigations; the terrorist task force and the contact 
point with the FBI were also evaluated. Another contact point (outside the 
Europol Convention) was established between Eurojust and Europol. In 
relation with the European Police School Copenhagen was selected as a 
provisional headquarter, which in factual terms (as usual in seat battles) 
implicated to unlock its program and budget. Lastly, a weak political 
agreement was reached to improve Schengen in the future: in cross-border 
inspection and to elaborate a catalogue of recommendations and practices.  
 
60  In relation with the obsession of Spanish Governments with certain rulings coming 
from Belgium courts in favor to ETA terrorist interest, it should be underlined that a 
Socialist Home Affairs Minister and his Secretary of State has been found guilty of 
“state terrorism” by the Spanish Supreme Court in the GAL case. In other cases (as 
Lasa y Zabala) the same with: civil servants, a Province Governor, a Civil Guard 
General, etc.  
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XIII.  Responses to the current wave of terrorism 
The “war” declared against terror by the USA, and adopted mutatis mutandis 
by the EU, is a global one. It covers a big spectrum of activities, from aircraft 
security to financial operations. The need to link financial and police aspects 
(money laundry, asset freezing, cooperation between intelligence unit of the 
Member States, etc.) demanded to put together both JHA and Ecofin Councils. 
The Spanish Presidency, with a long experience in the struggle against 
terrorism, was aware of such a necessity from the very beginning.
61 It placed 
both Councils to work in a twofold measures package: to avoid that terrorists 
continue having support infrastructure (financial or logistic); avoiding the 
possibility of terrorists to take advantage of legal vacuums created by plurality 
and disparity of systems in order to try covering up infrastructure of that kind. 
The concrete measures taken were the following. Firstly, a common position 
in asset freezing and a specific regulation on that matter was approved. 
Secondly, a group of measures addressing the establishment of a Common 
System of Visa Information Exchange was authorized. Lastly, the approval of 
a program to improve the cooperation in population protection in case of 
bacteriologic, chemical or nuclear attack was taken. In a less binding legal 
fashion, the European Union List of Terrorist Elements, Organizations and 
Entities (adopted during the Belgium Presidency) was revised including new 
20 groups and 8 individuals. Within this legal realm extent a report on 
evaluation risk in air transportation was elaborated. 
XIV. International  cooperation 
The same rationale was applied to promote intra-communitarian cooperation: 
the internationalization of terrorist organizations demands international and 
intra-EU cooperation in the battle against terrorism. Regardless, the main 
impulse to develop this branch comes from USA’s interest. This is true for 
 
61  As it was reflected in “More Europe”, point 1.3. 
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most parts of the EU Member States, but particularly for Great Britain 
(unnecessary to explain why) and Spain. The reasons for Spain are more 
pragmatic: exchange of favors in the Al-Qaeda-ETA scope. To Spain it is 
interesting to play a role in the Latin-American popular-guerrillas front, as the 
voice of Latin-American Governments in the EU, including for instance the 
Colombian’s FARC or the Peruan’ Sendero Luminoso in the EU terrorist list. 
Three actions were underlined by the Spanish Presidency in this field.
62 
Firstly, the EU supported the conclusion of a Global Convention against 
International Terrorism in United Nations. Secondly, the introduction of 
cooperation against terrorism in the Council of Europe as well as in the 
accession negotiations of European States that are currently involved. Thirdly, 
it introduced the “anti-terrorist” clause in every new cooperation agreement 
with third countries.  
Common Policy on Asylum and Immigration 
In “More Europe”, the official document in which the Spanish Presidency 
presented its priorities, the aim we will discuss was included within the point 
Combating terrorism in an area of freedom, security, and justice. Taking into 
account the four precedent points, it is obvious that little has been said about 
the so-called “area of freedom, security, and justice”. The development of this 
area was left aside, as a last aim of the priorities document, titled “Fulfilling 
Tampere”.
63 Afterwards, due to a personal commitment of President Aznar, 
not without his honeymoon partner Premier Blair, the policy took a most 
conservative and restrictive orientation that one could have expected in its 
original foundation.
64 Finally, the Seville European Council re-baptized it as 
Common Policy on Asylum and Immigration. 
 
62  See Conclusiones del Gobierno español sobre la Presidencia de la Union Europea, point 2 A) 4. 
63  “More Europe”, point 1.5. 
64  A formulated expression of a personal understanding and their idea to determine the 
Spanish Presidency Agenda took place in a joint article titled “More Europe, better 
Europe”, 22-11-2002. 
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The location of the aim “Fulfilling Tampere” and of four topics fully tied to 
the police side of the policy shows a rather conservative approach to the 
problem, which tends to link both sides of the policy (police and justice) 
forgetting about its nature. The Ministry of Justice, to say it in graphic terms, 
is the constitutional voice in the Government. It facilitates the judicial power 
facing the Home Affairs impetus to cover its agenda stepping on constitutional 
fundamentals. This is the reason why both governmental branches should 
remain in opposite benches. This constitutional rationale, overlooked in many 
modern countries,
65 suffered a great threat on September 11. Almost no 
Government resisted to take advantage of public opinion sensibility to enact 
more restrictive legislation in many of its home affairs competencies. 
Tampere, at least formally, pretends to cover the problem at hand from a broad 
perspective: Freedom and Justice were at the same level of the Security side. 
Without ever mentioning (“social justice” as fundamental as formal justice), 
Tampere, and to a certain extent Laeken, seek full recognition of fundamental 
rights and legitimate social aspiration of third countries emigrants. Spain from 
the very beginning of its Presidency, despite recognizing that Tampere’s 
impulse covers much more than security, announced that “current exceptional 
circumstances require putting security first.”
66 The final balance shows that 
“putting security first” meant to monopolize the agenda.  
The Seville European Council articulated, closed and summarized the Spanish 
Presidency contribution in this field.
67 The set of measures presented by the 
 
65  In Spain, during the last socialist Government, both Ministries joined in one; in the last 
governmental reform (July 2002), the former Minister of Justice became Home Affairs 
Minister letting his former Justice Secretary of State as Ministry of Justice, seeking for 
reaching a de facto free way between both ministries. In Great Britain the Prime 
Minister has become himself the best guarantee of interaction among ministries, even 
including the Defense Minister if one considers his proposal to use Army Ships against 
pateras. 
66  “More Europe”, point 1.5. 
67  See Presidency Conclusions of the Seville European Council, 21 and 22 of June 2002, 
II. Asylum and Migration, points 26-39. 
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Spanish Presidency on immigration and asylum are divided into four pillars. 
The first introduced a series of measures enabling the EU to tackle illegal 
immigration. The Council indicated that some of the measures contained in the 
Global Plan, approved during the Spanish Presidency, repelling illegal 
immigration, need to be implemented as a matter of priority. Accordingly, 
Seville European Council established that before the end of 2002 the list of 
third States, whose nationals are subjected to or exempted from visa 
requirements, should be reviewed; to introduce a common system of visa 
identification as soon as possible; to speed up the conclusion of the 
readmission agreements currently being negotiated and the negotiation of new 
agreements; and to adopt the elements of a repatriation programme and to 
approve the Framework Decisions on trade and illegal trafficking in human 
beings.  
The second Pillar consists of introducing a coordinated and integrated 
management of the Union’s external borders. As it is well-known, the Member 
States’ real borders are the external borders of the Union, at least through 
maritime and ground transportation, still many illegal emigrants come to 
Europe through airports. The goal of the Spanish Presidency here was that 
Member States start managing their borders as the territorial limits of the 
Union in a coordinated way, since this is the manner to get effective results. 
Furthermore, it was considered to be the first step towards a border policy for 
the European Union.  
Weeks before the Seville European Council the Plan for management of 
Member States external borders, which aims to achieve a better control of 
migration flows, was authorized. To support that, the Heads of State or 
Government decided that before the end 2002 (during the Danish Presidency) 
the following measures should be enacted: the joint operations at external 
border; the creation of a network of Member State immigration connection 
police; the commencement of a pilot project of border management. In a 
second wave of measures, before the end of June 2003: to establish the core 
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curriculum for border guard training; to examine the possibilities to establish a 
regime of border-sharing between Member States and the Union. 
The third group of measures consists of, diplomatically called, “integrating 
immigration polity into the Union’s relations with third countries”. In a 
straight formulation, to press third countries to second EU interest in this 
matter. In that direction it was agreed to include a clause on common 
management of migratory flows and compulsory readmission in the event of 
illegal immigration, into all its future agreements with third countries. Spain 
together with Britain spoke openly about sanctions to countries collaborating 
with illegal immigration (for instance Morocco). Other countries, like Benelux 
and France, rejected extreme measures. The final agreement reduced the 
wording to the pre-threat boundaries. In the eve of a manifest lack of 
cooperation by third countries, the Council, with unanimity, may adopt 
measures or positions under the Common Foreign and Security Policy and 
other EU policies,  
“while honoring the Union’s contractual commitments and not jeopardizing 
development cooperation objectives”.
68 
Finally, the Spanish Presidency, not being able to approve concrete measures 
to create a common policy on asylum and immigration, was forced to fix the 
legislative deadlines for some measures initiated during its Presidency. Thus, 
the Seville European Council agreed that: by December 2002, the conditions 
will be approved for determining, which countries are responsible for 
processing requests for asylum; before June 2003 rules will be adopted on the 
requirements for qualification and status as refugees, as well as provisions on 
family reunification and the status of long-term permanent residents; by 
December 2003 common standards will be adopted for asylum procedures. 
 
68  Ibid., point 36. 
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Successful introduction of the Euro 
The beginning of the Spanish Presidency, as contemporary history will 
remember, coincides with a much more important event: the birth of the Euro 
as a single currency for 12 EU Member States. Since the creation of the 
European Communities the Euro has been the most important event in the 
European history: as the biggest act of national sovereignty cession, or if 
preferred the strongest act of EU faith; and for being, as will turn out thanks to 
the “spill over” method, the biggest political impulse in EU history. 
Everything was meant to be ready on January the 1
st. The stabilizing of a 
single currency, and the substitution of 12 national currencies (not to forget 
other non-member countries attached to the DM) is the accumulation of a long 
preparation process and efficiency in meeting a goal, which was fulfilled ten 
years after the inclusion of the European Monetary Union in European 
Primary Law. Right before the Spanish Presidency took the leading EU role, 
the Ghent European Council enacted a statement on combating fraud and 
forgery with the occasion of the Euro entry into force. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that few leftovers, except the strictly necessary issues, were pending 
for the Spanish Presidency on this matter. These issues turned out to be related 
with the factual entry into force of the Euro and with aspects that address to 
facilitate the Euro future. Particularly that the Euro will acquire its full 
potential inside and outside the Eurozone.  
The first priority was to guarantee an orderly transition while the Euro is being 
introduced, ensuring that the fight against forgery and fraud is effective. The 
Spanish Presidency monitored the whole process in detail, in close 
collaboration with the Commission, the European Central Bank and the resting 
Members States.
69 For instance the coordination of the very complex technical 
aspects, guaranteeing a tidy transition. In order to facilitate that coordination 
 
69  This reality was duly recognized by Spanish Premier Mr. Aznar, see Comparecencia 
del Presidente del Gobierno ante el Pleno del Congreso de los Diputados para informar 
sobre las Conclusiones del Consejo Europeo de Sevilla, 20-5-2002. 
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the Information Exchange Net among Member States was developed. The 
adaptation of the Framework Decision about the Protection Strengthening 
with the aim to avoid fraud and forgery was put into practice.  
The second goal defined by the Spanish Presidency was to promote the role of 
the EU on the international level and enhancing the visibility of the single 
currency. The EU is comparable with the USA in terms of its economic size, 
at the same time it is consolidating its position as the world’s largest trading 
power. For the Spanish Presidency, this economic and commercial standing on 
the international level should start to have a noticeable effect on the political 
level.
70 Since the very beginning of European Monetary Union, in political 
and scientific fields, along with the idea of a single currency has always come 
the question of its representation. During the preliminaries of the Nice 
Intergovernmental Conference certain Members States upheld the idea of 
creating a Mr. Euro linked to the Ecofin. Romano Prodi addressed the 
European Parliament expressing its concern about such a possibility and 
stressing the Commission’s opposition to any new turn into a more 
intergovernmental EU.
71  
Nice did not introduce Mr. Euro and the external representation remains (so 
far) in the President of the Ecofin together with the European Council 
President. I cannot deal here with the difficulties that the multi-speed Europe 
creates: relations Euro 12 – Ecofin 15; Presidency rotations when the Member 
State holding the Presidency is not in the Euro 12, etc.
72 Regardless whoever 
takes the Presidency, there are two international forums where Euroland 
should be heard as such and not as a accumulation of States: international 
financial fora and multilateral financial organization. In the first group, the 
Spanish Presidency obtained its biggest achievement being present in the last 
 
70  “More Europe”, point 2.3. 
71  See Speech/00/352, Plenary Session of the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 3 October 
2000, especially “The danger of fragmentation,” p. 5. 
72 I have dealt in detail with this problem in “La Cooperación Reforzada tras Niza”, 
Revista de las Cortes Generales, number 50, 2001, pp. 75-81. 
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G-7 (+ Russia) meeting, objective attempted and not reached by other 
presidencies, which, as Spain, are not part of the forum.  
The third objective was defined as bolstering coordination of economic policy 
against the backdrop of stability. To achieve Euro’s full potential indoors, 
making out of it a key stability factor that instills confidence at the financial 
market and among consumers. In the Spanish Presidency’s view,
73 the way to 
fulfill that goal has a fundamental pre-requisite that national economic policies 
must be monitored and coordinated more closely in every respect (not just 
from the budgetary point of view) in order to give more than the economic 
policy decision requires, as to minimize any possible negative repercussions of 
reduced economic growth. 
This broad picture was linked to the Lisbon economic recipe and the long- 
term strategy (until 2010) attached to it. The economic agenda was basically 
articulated around the Barcelona European Council.  
The “spring” European Council of Barcelona European Council 
The Barcelona European Council as said, started somehow in Lisbon. The 
European Council of Lisbon was the most important summit in modern 
history, it meant the conversion of the EU into the predominant economic 
thought: the liberal, in its traditional conservative or in its more modern “third 
way” fashion. Aznar and Blair, significant representatives of this business way 
of dealing with politics, pushed forward the “conversion” in a context of 
eminent decline of progressive leaders. It is significant that Antonio Guterres 
hosted the Lisbon Summit while being, beside Portugal’s Prime Minister and 
President of the European Council, President of the International Socialist. His 
conversion to the third way was certainly not so important as the one played 
by the German Premier and its government. The only serious global 
alternative discourse came from Lionel Jospin, pretty limited by its national 
 
73  “More Europe”, point 2.2. 
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cohabitation, particularly in the European Council (foreign affairs). To this 
alternative agenda the “Nordic Social-Green” sensibility, supported partially 
by Germany, due to its Governmental coalition was added.  
The final result of the Lisbon summit was an economic liberal agenda 
(between Berger and Giddens) until 2010 with some social and environmental 
concessions. The Heads of State or Government, in order to guarantee Lisbon 
guidelines to be implemented, agreed that every spring European Council 
would be dedicated primarily to economic affairs. Barcelona arrived two years 
later, in the Report addressed to the summit by the Commission, the European 
executive considers that the key aspect of the Lisbon agenda was not fulfilled 
according to the predetermined schedule and deadlines.
74  
Despite of the general agreement reached at Lisbon, grounded in a shared 
economic view, specific dossiers find (especially in those fields governed by 
unanimity) national interests resistance and consequently vetoes, for instance: 
energetic liberalization for France, fiscal harmonization for Great Britain, etc. 
Aznar, once again with Blair’s support,
75 was fully committed to re-inject 
impetus to the Lisbon agenda. Not only pushing forward concrete dossiers, but 
reasserting its economic ideological dimension for the future. This latter 
aspect was the main reason why the Spanish Presidency invited the Heads of 
State or Government from accession countries, in President Aznar wording: 
“to involve and compromise our future partners with the Lisbon strategic”,
76 
that is to say: to bless the “unique economic thought” before hand, avoiding 
 
74  “Comunicación de la Comisión al Consejo Europeo de primavera en Barcelona, La 
estrategia de Lisboa-hacer realidad el cambio”, Bruselas, 15-1-2000, COM (2002) 14 
final, see “Summary” and point 2 of the Report “Progreso hacia los objetivos de 
Lisboa”, p. 8 and following. 
75  Their vision on the Barcelona European Council agenda was spoken up as early as in 
November 2001, see their joint article “More Europe, better Europe”, cit. 
76  “Carta del Presidente del Consejo Europeo, José María Aznar, a los Países Miembros 
de la UE con motivo del Consejo Europeo de Barcelona”, 11-3-2002. 
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surprises after the enlargement.
77 The working meeting among EU and 
candidate States leaders took place during the second half of the first session.
78 
In parallel two meetings took place, among Economic and Financial Ministers, 
on the one hand; and among Foreign Minister, on the other. These meetings 
agreed not only on the assumption of Lisbon strategy once candidates will be 
in the EU, but on the incorporation of its philosophy in current structural 
economic changes.  
Going into the concrete measures adopted in Barcelona, taking note of the 
impossibility to reflect all,
79 I will outline those achievements declared more 
important by the Presidency along the lines of its five priority fields. With 
regard to the financial services, the main efforts referred to speed up the 
regulatory procedures, with implementation of the so-called “Lamfalussy 
proposals”, and on specific initiatives to fulfill the Financial Services Action 
Plan: the regulation on the approval of international accounting norms was 
adopted; 2003 was fixed as a deadline for a full integration of stock markets; 
and 2005 for the services markets.  
In relation with the liberalization of the energetic single market, the main 
objectives were to open up the markets and to integrate them on the European 
level by means of relevant interconnections. The economic rationale 
underneath the liberal one: more liberalization, more competition, lower rates 
 
77  It should be underlined that with similar intention, the “Social Meeting of Barcelona” 
took place, one day before the official summit. Laeken agreed to formalize these 
summits linked to the “Spring European Council Meetings”. The “Social Meeting of 
Barcelona” was divided in two parts. In the first, under the direction of the President of 
the European Council, consecrated itself to the Lisbon strategy and the Barcelona 
approach to it. In the second, the social interlocutors had the opportunity to address 
their opinion about the Commission working documents for the European Council. 
Being in the eve of the summit one can see the impossibilities of factual repercussions 
of the mentioned contributions. 
78  See “Programa del Consejo Europeo de Barcelona”, 15-16/03-2002. 
79  For a deeper view: see part I and II of the Presidency Conclusions of the Barcelona 
European Council, 15 and 16 of March 2002; Conclusiones del Gobierno español sobre 
la Presidencia de la Union Europea, point B) 2. 
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and more efficient markets. The concrete measures: 70 % of the gas and 
electricity market (except domestic consumption) will be open to consumers 
election; a modest political agreement to reach 10 % of the cross-border 
electricity interconnection will be liberalized; accordingly, by 2002, to 
establish simple, clearer and non discriminatory tariffs in electric cross-border 
transactions. 
Another key issue has been the transport and communication agenda, which 
tries to link Europe up more efficiently. Here, agreement was reached on the 
review of the trans-European transport networks with new projects in regions, 
such as the Pyrenees and the Alps, two of the greatest bottlenecks in Europe. 
The “European Single Sky” will be adopted before 2004 in this context as a 
previous step: the Eurocontrol system will be an impulse and norms for the 
time zones assignation will be enacted by the end of the year. In the 
communication area political impetus was given to developing broad-bands 
networks at both European and national level: a Telecommunications 
Legislative Package was approved; as well as a political agreement to use 
broad-bands networks by 2005 was reached. The highlight in this field was the 
go-ahead given to the Galileo Programme. 
Fifthly, employment and education were put together by the Spanish 
Presidency agenda without results. In Lisbon the Heads of State or 
Government pointed out their intention to get full employment by 2010, which 
will imply to create 20 million new jobs by that date, keeping in mind current 
employment destruction. This ambitious goal was seconded by the 
“Employment Strategy” approved in Luxembourg. During the Spanish 
Presidency, the Luxembourg Strategy was linked to Lisbon guidelines and 
2010 horizon. Continuing in the liberal rationale, the agreement is focused on 
the need to remove the barriers that make it difficult for people to enter the 
labor market, barriers deriving from tax systems, social security systems and 
the mobility of workers within the Union. President Aznar emphasized as a 
positive fact that such reforms have already been taken in some Member 
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States,
80 but he forgot to say that after being approved, they were followed by 
general strikes in Italy and Spain. 
The concrete agreements are: the creation of a European Health Card; to raise 
the average age of retirement; to facilitate women incorporation to the labor 
market (infant infrastructure); the creation of a Web Page of labor mobility. At 
the educational front, much to do about nothing: political agreement on the 
need to facilitate that European citizens can speak a language other than their 
mother tongue; a vague and abstract agreement was reached to achieve by 
2003 transparent titles and qualification recognition. 
The Enlargement 
After the Euro, the Enlargement was the most defined theme of the Spanish 
Presidency. The enlargement schedule and road map were defined at the 
Stockholm and at the Göteborg European Council summits. Together with 
them, the Berlin European Council defined the financial guidelines that were 
necessary in order to reach a successful enlargement: mainly imposing not to 
develop new EC policies that could imply further difficulties for the accession 
states and the whole enlargement process, provoking a potential delay. 
The cited enlargement schedule foresaw the celebration of a special European 
Council in autumn 2002 during the Danish Presidency that commenced after 
the Spanish. This European Council will indicate, which countries can 
complete their negotiations by the end of the Danish Presidency and which 
will have to wait until the demanded requirements are fulfilled. Those selected 
will sign their respective Accession Treaties at the beginning of the 
forthcoming year,
81 so that new Member States will participate as fully-
fledged members in the European Parliament elections in June 2004. This road 
 
80 Comparecencia del Presidente del Gobierno ante el Pleno del Congreso de los 
Diputados para informar sobre las Conclusiones del Consejo Europeo de Sevilla, cit. 
81 The Committee of Accession Treaties Drafting was constituted during the Spanish 
Presidency. 
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map and fixed schedule placed the Spanish Presidency as the first of the final 
steps, therefore with the obligation to tackle some compulsory objectives.  
In its priorities, the Spanish Presidency expressed that its intention would be 
to make a decisive contribution to ensuring that negotiations with all those 
candidate States which are prepared can be concluded by the end of 2002, as 
provided in Göteborg.
82 The main problems for the 15 Member States to reach 
common positions were already known, besides the most complicated chapters 
of the acquis,
83 those chapters with greatest financial implications: agriculture, 
regional polity, financial and budgetary provisions, drawing upon the current 
financial perspectives of Berlin. Once the fulfillment of political criteria were 
clear by the 12 directly affected countries, economic criteria had to be the 
cornerstone and will continue to be so until the end of the enlargement process 
and beyond. 
The Spanish Presidency official discourse reflected the official EU discourse: 
“Spain and the Spanish public opinion have always whole-heartedly supported 
[the enlargement]”.
84 No comments on the supposed support of Spanish public 
opinion to the enlargement process, the same was said by the Irish 
Government before the “NO” to the Treaty of Nice.
85 About the Spanish 
political support many reflections can be made. If we remember, during the 
Nice Intergovernmental Conference, one of the most significant victories in 
Spanish Governments view,
86 was to keep unanimity where needed to renew 
 
82  “More Europe”, point 4. 
83  During the Spanish Presidency the first evaluation of the current application of the 
acquis for candidates countries took place. 
84  “More Europe”, point 4. 
85  Despite of Irish Government and EU institutions opinion about the Irish referendum, I 
have defended that the Irish people’s rejection was, among other reasons, due to 
concerns about the negative economic consequences that the enlargement will imply. 
J.M. Martínez Sierra, “La reforma constitucional y el referendum en Irlanda: a 
propósito de Niza”, Teoría y Realidad Constitucional, number 7, 2001, pp. 306-307. 
86  In such a way was emphasized by the former Spanish Ambassador before the EU Javier 
Elorza, in his article “La UE después de Niza”, Política Exterior, number 79, 2001, p. 
85.  
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the current financial perspective (beyond 2005) avoiding Germany (and rest of 
“payers”) intentions to use the enlargement to drastically change the current 
system.
87 But cohesion funds are not the only topic that caused Spain to be 
reluctant towards the enlargement. We have already mentioned how its 
position in relation with the CAP and fishing did not facilitate important steps 
towards fulfilling the enlargement in due time. Thus, deep inside, Spain 
supports the enlargement as long as it does not negatively affect its essential 
interest. Therefore, the Spanish Presidency was not the best political option 
for holding the Presidency in charge to close the negotiations. Being the prior 
one, it could adapt itself to the enlargement road map demands particularly 
because, as it is already known in accession process, until everything is closed 
nothing is definitely locked. 
Going into a brief summary of concrete achievements, the Spanish Presidency 
reached common positions in the entire chapter assigned to it: Regional 
Policy, Budget and Financial Dispositions, Institutions and Agriculture. In this 
later field, it was impossible to reach an agreement about payments modalities, 
hence it will have to be fully tackled by the Danish Presidency.  
Summarizing, during the Spanish Presidency, 96 chapters were negotiated in 
total, 56 of them were provisionally closed, 22 chapters were open for the first 
time since negotiations started.
88 Among the chapters provisionally closed, 
some consider the following as sensitive for national interest: free movements 
of Capital in Poland, Energy with Lithuania and Justice and Home Affairs 
with many candidates. From 30 chapters in total, attending to the record of the 
10 initial candidates, the following were closed: 28 with Lithuania and 
 
87 In deeper detail, J.M. Martínez Sierra, “El Tratado de Niza”, Revista Española de 
Derecho Constitucional, number 62, 2001, pp. 241-242. 
88  See Resultados de las Conferencias de Adhesión a nivel de Suplentes con los Países 
Candidatos, Data obtained from the 4th and last round of negotiations closed in 
Brussels, 28 June 2002. 
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Cyprus,
89 27 with Slovenia and Latvia, 26 with Slovak and Estonia, 25 with 
Poland and the Czech Republic, 24 with Hungary and 23 with Malta. After the 
Spanish Presidency Bulgaria and Rumania continue at the very back of the 
train. The only record presented by the Spanish Presidency was the opening of 
the chapters still closed. This should not be considered as a failure, as it is 
well-known, the hope in Bulgaria and Rumania was lost during the Treaty of 
Nice, when they were implicitly left out in the institutional transitions 
periods.
90  
Debate on the future of Europe. 
The Spanish Presidency gave a twofold dimension to the so-called debate on 
the future of Europe: on the one hand, the European Convention in the 
preliminaries of the next Intergovernmental Conference; on the other, the 
reform of the Council of the Union. These two combined factors were so far 
formally kept in different scenarios attending to their objectives. The 
European Convention is part of an emerging sui generis constitutional power. 
It aims to reform Primary Law and is already involved in a process that 
potentially could end up in formal Constitution.
91 On the contrary, the reform 
of the Council of the Union came from the genesis (Trumpf Report-Finish 
1999 Presidency) linked to an operational institutional reform. Precisely, one 
of the main characteristics in that reform is not to attempt Treaty modification. 
It was never linked to a deeper constitutional process and debate, but to 
concrete measures to enable the enlargement. About the reform of the Council 
I refer to the first part of this paper. 
 
89  In relation with Cyprus political problem, the Spanish Presidency just supported United 
Nations efforts. 
90  See J.M. Martínez Sierra, “El Tratado de Niza”, cit., pp. 224-234.  
91 About this process I have already articulated in detail, “El debate Constitucional 
Europeo”, Revista de Estudios Políticos, number 113, 2001, pp. 197 and following. 
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The fact that the Spanish Presidency attached both aspects,
92 had to do 
essentially with organizational reasons. Certainly not with any intention of the 
Spanish Presidency to increase the European Convention agenda. Much on the 
contrary, if something should be underlined from the Spanish contribution to 
the future of Europe, it is the absence of “European spirit”, surely inspired by 
Aznar’s “grown national pragmatism”. If one examines some of the main 
political contributions to the constitutional debate (Chirac,
93 Fischer,
94 
Ciampi
95) and compares them with Aznar’s speech at the Center for European 
Studies of St. Anthony’s College,
96 the meaning of euroscepticism will be 
 
92  See for instance: the Presidency Guidelines, the Presidency Results Report and the 
Seville European Council Conclusions. 
93  “Plusieurs formules sont envisageables, du Comité des sages à un modèle inspiré par la 
Convention qui rédige notre Charte des droits fondamentaux. Et à l'issue de ces travaux 
qui prendront sans doute quelque temps, les gouvernements puis les peuples seraient 
appelés à se prononcer sur un texte que nous pourrons alors consacrer comme la 
première ‘Constitution européenne’ ”, Notre Europe, Speech of the French President 
Jacques Chirac before the German Bundestag, 27-6-2000, http://www.presidence-
europe.fr/pfue/page-ossier6.htm?dossier=00383&nav=6&lang=6&rubrique=-
1&page=1. 
94 “Fragen über Fragen, auf die es allerdings eine ganz einfache Antwort gibt: den 
Übergang vom Staatenverbund der Union hin zur vollen Parlamentarisierung in einer 
Europäischen Föderation, die Robert Schuman bereits vor 50 Jahren gefordert hat.[...] 
Diese Föderation wird sich auf einen Verfassungsvertrag zu gründen haben.” Vom 
Staatenverbund zur Föderation: Gedanken über die Finalität der europäischen 
Integration, Speech of the German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer at the Humboldt 
University of Berlin 12-5-2000, http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/00/ 
joschka_fischer_ge.rtf. 
95  Discorso del Presidente della Repubblica Carlo Azeglio Ciampi in occasione del c
  onferimento della laurea Honoris Causa dell’ Università di Lipsia, 6-6-2000. 
http://www.quirinale.it/Discorsi/Discorso.asp?id=12587. 
96 “Permítanme comenzar con una declaración de principios que ya he hecho en 
otrasocasiones pero que creo que debe ser la base de toda reflexión sobre el futuro de 
nuestro continente: la Unión Europea es, y deberá seguir siendo, una Unión de Estados 
Nacionales que tienen personalidades distintas, historias distintas y culturas diferentes 
entre si, Estados diferenciados que han encontrado una formula de conseguir mayor  
seguridad y mayor bien estar para sus ciudadanos, a base de integrarse, de hacer cosas  
juntas en beneficio de todos.” Discurso del Presidente del Consejo Europeo en el St.  
Anthony’s College, 20-05-2002. 
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better understood. One will see the difference between a political and a 
bureaucratic speech, and certainly feel the self-contradiction involved in the 
unbalanced Europe discourse: economic giant but political dwarf; federal 
decision-making and legal order but national-intergovernmental legitimacy.  
Once asserted that the European Convention was during the Spanish 
Presidency the centre of the debate on the future of Europe, it is necessary to 
describe its contributions, if any. The Declaration on the Future of Europe, 
annexed to the Treaty of Nice, drew up an initial agenda for 2004 
Intergovernmental Conference and gave the Belgium 2001 Presidency the 
mandate to implement it.
97 The fourth chapter of the Belgium priorities note 
was entitled “The future of the European Union: towards an ambitious 
Declaration of Brussels-Laeken,”
98 which concluded in the Laeken 
Declaration. There, the European Convention was chosen as the method to 
follow and where the agenda is defined in a broad and flexible manner. To 
finish the Convention architecture, during the Belgium Presidency the 
Convention composition
99 and the Presidium were decided.
100 Therefore little 
margin was left for the Spanish Presidency. 
The first measure taken by the Spanish Presidency was to approve the 
Convention financing, through a Decision and an Inter-institutional 
agreement. Secondly, on 28 February 2002, the Convention was constituted 
holding its first meeting with the participation of the Spanish Premier as 
 
97  J.M. Martínez Sierra, “El debate Constitucional Europeo”, cit., 194-196. 
98  “The Belgian Presidency of the European Union, 1 July-31 December 2001: Priorities  
note”. 
99  One representative of each national Government, two representatives of every national 
parliament, two representatives of the Commission and 16 representatives of the 
European Parliament. Candidate Member States are involved in the Convention 
proceedings without having full representation. Observers from other parties are 
presented: Economic and Social Committee, the European social partners and 
Committee of Regions. 
100 Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (former French President) was appointed as Chairman of the 
Convention; two Vice-chairmen completed the Presidium: Jean Luc Dehaene (former 
Belgium Prime Minister) and Giuliano Amato (former Italian Prime Minister). 
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President of the European Council. The Spanish Presidency committed itself 
to two aspects. Firstly, to promote the synergy between the European 
Convention and the European Council, particularly to keep the second 
informed of facilitating the Presidium for such an action. Thus, during the 
Seville European Council, the President of the Convention presented to the 
Heads of State and Government an oral report on the evolution of the 
Convention’s works and about the forums articulated to facilitate civil society 
contributions. It should be noticed that during the 3 months that the Spanish 
Presidency lived together with the Convention, the latter was basically 
committed to the exposition stage, and passed after the Seville meeting to a 
deeper study of the items put previously. As this was exposed by Valéry 
Giscard d’Estaing to the European Council, it is not surprising that the Heads 
of State and Government at Seville showed their general support to the 
evolution followed so far.
 101 
The second aspect to which the Spanish Presidency committed itself was to 
chair the coordination meetings of the governmental representatives in the 
Convention. The Convention is a new method in the constitutionalization 
process and it appears, at least at first sight, in its composition and spirit 
independent. Therefore a clear question arises: why and how do the Member 
States coordinate themselves before the Convention? The answer has to be 
found in the Convention method and its potential danger for Member States in 
the fate of the next Intergovernmental Conference. 
The Convention method, despite being new in the EU constitutionalization 
process, had an important precedent in the elaboration process of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights. The Convention, after its long debating period came 
up with a Charter of Fundamental Rights completed in every dimension. A 
deep consensus was created around it among Convention members, which to a 
similar extent involved some EU institutions and generally “EU lobby” 
 
101 Presidency Conclusions of the Seville European Council, 21 and 22 of June 2002, point 
2. 
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(scholarly, relevant politicians, social figures, etc.) All this, as a snow ball 
rolling down the hill, drove the European Council into a “take or leave it” plot, 
pretty far from the “pick and choose” comfortable scenario expected in the 
beginning. This was a feared scenario by Member States when confirming the 
Convention as part of the constitutional method.  
In order to avoid such a situation, the European Council introduced the 
following mechanism.
102 In the first place, they elected the Presidium, and as 
President they elected the father of the European Council: no comments on 
that. Secondly, the Laeken Declaration left clear that the Convention will not 
come up with a compulsory document: the Convention “will draw up a final 
document which may compromise either different options, indicating the 
degree of support which they received, or recommendations if consensus is 
achieved.” Thirdly, in Spanish Presidency wording there will be 
“a long enough period of reflection between completion of the Convention’s work 
and the beginning of the IGC, so that the Convention’s results can be discussed in 
the framework of the national debates and in the national parliaments.”
103 
Together with this coherent provision and objective, taking into account the 
complexity of the EU constitutional implications (national and supranational), 
the European Council  
“also hoped that by inserting this break, a number of Convention decisions will be 
‘forgotten’, or at least toned down.”
104 
There are reasons for European Council concerns, the European Convention 
within the European constitutionalization process can turn into a Pandora’s 
box. So that the Spanish Presidency has, right from the start, emphasized that 
the consolidation of the Convention in the constitutional architecture, in the 
 
102 See in more detail Hendrik Voss and Emilie Bailleul, The Belgian Presidency and the 
post-Nice process after Laeken, cit., pp. 21-23. 
103 “More Europe”, point 6, pp. . 17-18. 
104 Hendrik Voss and Emilie Bailleul, The Belgian Presidency and the post-Nice process 
after Laeken, cit., p. 21. 
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future as a “preparatory instrument” for the IGC, will depend on its success.
105 
Clarifying that the IGC has the last word and that Convention’s future will 
depend on its capacity (will) to remain within the written screenplay. To ease 
the process, the European Council took the above mentioned measures to 
narrow down Convention freedom.  
The last and definitive measure, applicable since the Spanish Presidency, is 
the coordination of the governmental representatives in the Convention, whose 
objective it is to generate a homogenous group capable of avoiding consensus 
in those fields that are more sensitive for Member States. Creating a “shopping 
scenario”; or, in negative, eluding the possibility of seeing themselves in front 
of a full Constitution and an “all or nothing” scenario. During the Spanish 
Presidency, as previously explained, the course of the Convention debates did 
not have time to reach sensitive negotiations areas. Hence, we will have to 
wait and see. I personally do not have big expectations, but the existing 
depends on two related aspects: the capacity of European Members of 
Parliament to seduce national representatives (parliamentarian and 
governmental);
106 and the capacity of governmental representatives to take 
conscience of their historical opportunity, shielding themselves from their 
“Ambassadors role”.
107  
External relations: “More Europe” in the world 
A well-known international newspaper once published a kind of ingenious 
joke about Arafat’s unstoppable world tour, the text read something like: “join 
 
105 “More Europe”, point 6, p., 17. 
106 Remember for instance how they did it in the Rome Assises. 
107 Though in a different context, but also transcendental, I would like to remember how 
this process was produced in the Committee that drafted the Euro/European Central 
Bank Report, composed by the Commission President (who planned the operation and 
chaired the Committee) and the Presidents of the Member States Central Banks. 
Despite some national governmental pressures to make it fail, the Members generated a 
synergy and signed the Report which turned out to be so significant for the European 
Monetary Union strategy.  
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the peace process and see the world.” In its priorities the Spanish Presidency 
promised that the Union would visit part of the world and the rest would come 
to visit the Union. In “More Europe” one can find the following 11 points:
108 
Transatlantic relations, the situation in Afghanistan, the Middle East Peace 
Process, the Euro-Mediterranean Association, Russia, Western Balkans, Latin 
America, Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, United Nations and Development 
cooperation. That mega activity, in the Spanish’s Presidency view, was 
justified and related to the September 11.
109 When the Presidency was finished 
and the reflection time started, the Spanish agenda showed itself far too 
ambitious. Such a conclusion is implicitly presented in the official balances 
presented by the Spanish Presidency, which simply left out some of the above 
mentioned points, or simply can underline vague political agreements as 
significant achievements.
110 Regardless, along the way, agreements had been 
reached and important exploring efforts were made. The most significant are 
summarized immediately below, along the lines of the Spanish Presidency 
conclusion. 
XV.  The Fifth Euro-Mediterranean Conference 
Beyond the foreign relations connected with the fight against terrorism, the 
Mediterranean and Latin America are the Spanish natural sensitive areas 
within international relations. During the Spanish Presidency the Fifth Euro-
Mediterranean Conference took place at a ministerial level (Valencia, 22-23 
April).
111 The Conference tried to follow the impulse given by the Barcelona 
Conference. There, being the genesis of the process, the Minister of Foreign 
 
108 “More Europe”, point 5, pp. 14-16. 
109  Comparecencia del Presidente del Gobierno en el Congreso de los Diputados para 
explicar las prioridades de la Presidencia Española de la UE, 10-12-2001. 
110 Conclusiones del Gobierno español sobre la Presidencia de la Union Europea, point D), 
pp.14-18; Address of the President of the European Council to the European Parliament 
on the Spanish Presidency, Strasbourg, 2-7-2002. 
111 See Programa de la V Conferencia Ministerial Euromediterranea, 22/23-4-2002. 
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affairs enacted the foundational “Declaration of Barcelona”, agreeing on 
meeting periodically in order to follow the realization of cited declaration and 
to define new goals to achieve collaboration objectives.
112 
Though the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation historically has a broad 
perspective, its major achievements came in the economic-regional field.
113 
The agenda of the Valencia Conference explored a wide range of economic, 
political and cultural aspects.
114 Finally, attending to the Presidency 
Conclusions of the Conference,
115 and to the political environment, the 
following aspects deserve to be underlined. The Valencia Action Plan
116 was 
approved, which pretends to be a new impulse to the process in its three 
historical dimensions: political, economic and cultural. This is the first 
document of that range adopted in the conferences. Some decisions were taken 
besides the Action Plan but certainly in relation with those fields. In the 
economic field, the following was adopted: a political agreement to fix for 
2010 an Euro-Mediterranean free market area; agreement to promote 
inversions in infrastructure and interconnections of transports, energetic and 
telecommunications networks. Within the political context, the creation of an 
Euro-Mediterranean parliamentarian Assembly, so promising as the many 
existing, was agreed. In the cultural sphere, it was agreed: the extension of the 
 
112  See the point “Actuación consecutiva a la conferencia”, Declaración de Barcelona, 
adoptada en la Conferencia Euromediterránea, 27/28-11-1995.  
113 For instance the so-called MEDA actions, see the “Reglamento (CE) No 1488/96 del 
Consejo, relativo a las medidas de acompañamiento financieras y técnicas (MEDA)” de 
las reformas de las estructuras económicas y sociales en el marco de la colabiración 
euromediterránea”, OJ L 189, 30-7-1996; modified by Council Regulation (CE) No 
780/98 , OJ L 113, 15-4-1998; and Council Regulation (CE) No 2698/2000 , OJ L 311, 
12-12-2000. 
114 See “Comunicación de la Comisión al Consejo y al Parlamento Europeo de preparación 
de la reunión de ministros euromediterráneos de asuntos exteriores”, SEC (2002) 159 
final. 
115 Conclusiones de la Presidencia de la Conferencia Euromediterránea, 22/23-4-2002. 
116 The Valencia Action Plant is included as annex II of the Conclusiones de la Presidencia 
de la Conferencia Euromediterránea, ibid. 
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Tempus program for not candidate partners and the creation of an Euro-
Mediterranean observatory for professional formation and employment. 
Terrorism, of course, was included for the first time in the Euro-Mediterranean 
agenda with the approval of the Framework Document including: regional 
cooperation programme in the field of justice, in combating drugs, organized 
crime and terrorism as well as cooperation in the treatment of issues relating to 
the social integration of migrants, migration and movement of people.
117 
Thirdly, the Euro-Mediterranean Conference hosted the signature of both 
association agreements with Algeria and Lebanon, which was a success owed 
to previous presidencies. 
XVI.  The Transatlantic relations 
As it has already been explained, as far as the EU-USA relationship is 
concerned, the main interest of the Spanish Presidency was focused on 
terrorism. In addition to the battle against terrorism, the Spanish Presidency 
pointed out the following priorities: environmental protection, the struggle 
against poverty in the developing countries and the multilateral increase of 
trade.
118 The Summit EU-USA, held in Washington on the 2
nd of May, was 
meant to reach substantial achievements in those fields, however nobody 
found reason for enthusiasm about the summit and generally about the 
Presidency since only political compromises were reached. 
In the battle against terrorism, it was not possible to elaborate a common 
terrorist list. As a substitute, a political agreement was reached to move 
towards a progressive convergence of both lists. The Summit, also in the 
terrorist context, showed the parties’ will to negotiate an agreement for 
Judicial Cooperation in the Penal and Extradition Fields. Coordination in “all” 
international affairs (Balkans, Afghanistan, relation with Russia, etc) was also 
 
117 The Framework document is included as annex II of the Conclusiones de la Presidencia 
de la Conferencia Euromediterránea, Ibid. 
118 “More Europe”, cit., point 5.2. 
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agreed. Finally it was agreed to keep a constructive dialogue in matters such 
as environmental and international trade. 
In the Spanish Presidency’s view, those agreements and the EU-USA Summit 
were a reason to be satisfied and to deny any critic of unilateralism to the 
USA.
119 Such a conclusion seems extremely optimistic taking into account 
recent developments, which simply reassert what was always known: the 
coordination and collaboration with USA goes until the perimeter of its 
interest. Examples can be found in almost every of the cited fields: Kyoto, 
International Criminal Court, Iron trade, Israel-Palestinian conflict, Iraq, etc. 
The relation EU-Canada was concentrated on at the Summit held in Toledo, 
8
th of May. It was scheduled 4 days after the United States-European Union 
Summit, establishing an agenda link before hand. That dependency, together 
with the small pre-existent bilateral relationship, determined the modest output 
of the Summit. Again, only political compromises were found. In the battle 
against terrorism, some contacts were reinforced in relation with Eurojust and 
Europol without reaching concrete agreements. Impelling force without 
factual decisions was also given to cooperation in the fields of research, 
science and technology development. 
XVII. The Summit between EU and Latin America and 
Caribbean Countries 
The first Summit of the Heads of State or Government of the countries of the 
EU, Latin America and the Caribbean Countries took place in Rio on 28 and 
29 June 1999. There, a Declaration and a Plan of Action were adopted and it 
was already agreed that a second summit would take place in Spain in 2002. 
The Rio Summit framed the guidelines of this new inter-regional relationship, 
 
119 Conclusiones del Gobierno español sobre la Presidencia de la Union Europea, pp. 15-
16. 
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as wanted by the EU,
120in three fields: political dialogue, economic and 
financial relationship and cooperation. From those 11 key priorities were 
subsequently selected in Tuusula by a bi-regional group of high officials with 
a view to give more focus to the overall process. Later, the Commission, in the 
view of the 2002 Spanish Summit, proposed to step up its actions in the 
following three priority issues: the protection and promotion of Human 
Rights, the promotion of the information society, and the reduction of the 
social imbalances.
121 Meanwhile, the Tuusula priority issues will continue to 
be dealt with existing cooperation instruments, including decentralized 
horizontal programmes.
122 The Rio Summit also adopted a bidimensional 
Summits’ format reflecting two strategic fronts: a global, taking the whole two 
regions; and a bilateral, taking separately existing Regional Organizations and 
main countries. 
The Madrid Summit (17 and 18 May 2002) followed the mentioned summit 
format being actually a summits’ marathon. Beside the central Summit of the 
Heads of State or Government of the EU, Latin America and the Caribbean 
Countries, the following bilateral summits took place: UE
123-Communidad 
Andina, UE-Centroamérica, UE-México and UE-Mercosur.  
Starting with the global dimension, the II Summit between EU and Latin 
America and Caribbean Countries approved the so-called Madrid 
Commitment. In it the Heads of State or Government decided to prepare a 
second Rio Declaration. Instead of looking for the practical approach intended 
by the Commission, fulfilling progressively some of the Rio goals, another 
broad political statement was made. Therefore the Heads of State or 
 
120 See the Commission Communication “On a new EU-Latin America partnership on the 
eve of the 21
st Century” (COM (1999) 105 final) and compare it with the “Rio Joint 
Declaration”. 
121  “Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament 
Follow-up to the First Summit Between Latin America, the Caribbean and the 
European Union”, COM (2000) 270 final, pp. 5 and 14. 
122 In particular the ALINVEST, ALURE, ALFA and URBAL. 
123 In the bilateral summits the EU was represented by the Troika. 
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Government agreed to undertake to develop a solid bi-regional strategic 
partnership, for instance, with the following commitments: to strengthen the 
multilateral system; to reinforce our democratic institutions and the rule of 
law, strengthening judicial systems ensuring equal treatment under the law and 
promoting and protecting respect for human rights; to combat terrorism in all 
its forms and manifestations; to strengthen co-operation to combat the 
scourges of illicit drugs and related crimes, corruption and organized crime, by 
enhancing co-ordination mechanisms; to eradicate racism, racial 
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance; to promote and protect the 
well-being of each child; to reinforce bi-regional political dialogue in 
international fora and consultations in the UN system and in major UN 
Conferences on the main questions of the international agenda. Therefore the 
Madrid Commitment mixed objectives with declarations and merely 
dissertations.  
EU-Chile relation has formally been the most successful one within the bi-
regional realm. During the Spanish Presidency the negotiations for an 
Association Agreement EU-Chile were closed, being signed during the 
Madrid Summit. It is one of the so-called “fourth generation” free trade 
agreements. If one takes into account that the first meeting of the Negotiation 
Committee took place in April 2000,
124 the Spanish Presidency achievement 
shows itself undeniable. 
The second remarkable country, as far as legal instruments are concerned, is 
Mexico. Mexico is the first country in Latin America with which the EU has a 
privileged partnership based on common interests and values of democracy 
and human rights. It is enshrined in the Economic Partnership, Political Co-
ordination and Co-operation Agreement (the “Global Agreement”) signed in 
1997 that came into force on 1 October 2000. The agreement provides for 
regular high-level political dialogue on bilateral and international issues. It is 
 
124 See “Conclusion First Meeting of the EU-Chile Negotiation Committee”, Santiago de 
Chile, 10 and 11 April 2002. 
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intended to define the framework for this bilateral relationship. It opens new 
prospects in terms of politics (institutionalization of the dialogue), economics 
and trade, with the establishment of a free trade area for goods and services 
(FTA), as well as in terms of corporations. During the Spanish Presidency the 
“Mexico Strategy” 2002-2006 has been defined.
125 For the rest, EU priorities 
of the Madrid Summit were: human rights, information society and social 
equality.
126 The 2
nd Joint Council of 13 May 2002 and the EU-Mexico Summit 
of 18 May 2002 simply underlined the convenience of developing such fields, 
particularly emphasizing the need of maintaining an open dialogue with 
Mexican and European civil society to exchange information and views on 
how best to avail of the opportunities offered by the Global Agreement. 
The relations with EU-Mercosur started back in 1992 with the Agreement for 
Inter-institutional Cooperation. Three years later the Agreement for Inter-
regional Cooperation was signed. The first Summit EU-Mercosur (Rio, June 
1999) gave mandate to open the negotiations for the Association Agreement. 
One year later the negotiations were open around three basic issues: political 
dialogue, economy and cooperation.
127 Before the Madrid Summit seven 
negotiation rounds took place, the latest in Argentine in April 2002. The 
intention of this meeting was to make a substantial progress before the Madrid 
Summit on 17 May 2002. Despite of the Spanish Presidency interest, many 
aspects were not so full-grown as to close the negotiations during the six 
months period. Finally the Summit simply reaffirmed the political support to 
the negotiations, it also convoked a special Ministerial EU-Mercosur meeting 
for July 2002. 
The rest of the bilateral relations are still far from reaching any of the 
described scenarios. Thus, the informal Summit UE-Centroamérica was the 
first ever. In Madrid only the compromise was reached to negotiate political 
 
125 “Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006-Mexico”, European Commission, 2002. 
126 Ibid., p. 5. 
127 In detail about the historical process and the current compromise, “Una asociación para 
el futuro”, Comisión Europea, Montevideo, Mayo de 2002, pp. 6-11. 
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and cooperation agreements with Centroamérica and the Andean Community, 
as well as to enhance commerce and financial cooperation in the view of 
impelling regional development. 
XVIII. The Summit between EU and Russia 
The relation EU-Russia does not have a brilliant history, neither was it the 
main priority of the Spanish Presidency. Regardless of that, the interest of 
some Member States
128 and the concrete interests of Spain, terrorism-justice 
and home affairs, made it gain some impetus. As a consequence, the first 
meeting of Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs (UE-Russia) took place. 
Those matters remained on top of the agenda at the Summit UE-Russia held in 
Moscow on 29
th of May: the fight against terrorism was included in the 
bilateral relationship and contact points for information exchange were 
created. Compensating Russia’s interests: a basis for a future agreement on 
Kaliningrad was established; the EU showed its disposition to recognize 
Russia as a market economy, previous step for a future WTO membership. 
Beside those fields, the Summit was filled up with political declarations: 
Moscow Declaration which defines the bilateral future framework, 
Declaration on the Middle-East, on Energetic dialogue, on Political dialogue, 
and on Cooperation in crisis management and security affairs. 
XIX.  The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) 
The Spanish view tried from the very beginning to link the ESDP with the 
September 11 hoping to push it forward.
129 In its view, the international 
 
128  Particularly important was the position of Chirac, who after meeting with Vladimir 
Putin during the beginning of the Spanish Presidency, asked personally Aznar to 
introduce main important points for Russia in the Presidency agenda: cooperation in 
security affairs, entrance of Russia in the WTO, Kaliningrado. See EFE report on UE-
ESPAÑA/FRANCIA, 18-1-2002 (EFE). 
129 See “More Europe”, point 5.1 
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situation in the wake of the crisis of September 11 has made it even more 
important that the ESDP becomes operational as soon as possible. It was a 
priority to take this chapter of the EU building further forward, since without 
it there can be no real dialogue of a Europe with its own identity in the 
international community. Another key priority was to launch a debate aimed at 
including the battle against terrorism as an ESDP objective, and providing 
ESDP means that are required to fulfill that objective. 
Despite the fact that the European Council in Laeken also shared the necessity 
to make ESDP more operational, no operational agreement in the cited field 
was reached, certainly not about the Spanish interest of linking ESDP to the 
battle against terrorism. In other fields more of the same, no further 
agreements, yet cooperation in armament or military capabilities. The attempts 
to reach an agreement to replace UN police in Bosnia by January 2003 failed. 
The same in relation with the replacement of NATO protection to international 
envoys in FYROM. In the positive balance the compromise should be counted 
found on financing the PSD, pending since the Swedish Presidency. The first 
“formal” Council of Defense Ministers was held and the first exercise of crisis 
management was realized, successfully using the EPSD decision-making 
structures and process. 
XX. Conclusions 
In the Report addressed by the Council Secretary-General at the Barcelona 
European Council,
130 one can find a precise description of the main problems 
facing the current Presidency system. National and European pressures force 
presidencies to take both agendas as their priorities. So normally every EU 
Presidency buys more than it can choose. The pressure of having to take stock 
at the end of each six-monthly period sometimes causes a rush. Such a celerity 
can lead to the adoption of makeshift decisions or a proliferation of badly 
 
130  “Preparing the Council for the Enlargement (Report by the Secretary-General)”, 
Brussels, 11 March 2002. 
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drafted or non-compulsory acts (resolutions, conclusions) when the Union’s 
interests would have been better served by the adoption of a more binding act 
that, in turn, would have required more lengthy negotiations stretching over 
several presidencies and on a high level of compatibility between national and 
EU agendas. This has clearly been the case of the Spanish Presidency, as we 
have seen in detail in every field except in relation with the Euro. There, 
precisely the Spanish Presidency simply had to implement what was 
previously defined. 
Member States observe the Presidency as their legitimate turn to take the 
steering wheel. It is better to have the opportunity to influence the agenda 
once in a while than never. This particularly is the case for smaller countries, 
which can hardly lead to a majority supporting its agenda in a normal EU 
daily life. This reality can lead to what we defined as Presidency’s “abuse”. 
The best confirmation of the power that the Presidency grants to the Member 
State in office, and of the general agreement to “share the cake”, is the 
everlasting resistance to introduce changes in the institution. These changes 
are required not only for the current negative functioning but also for the 
forthcoming enlargement. 
The forthcoming enlargement, besides being an objective reason for changing 
the institution we are dealing with, is facilitating the change of subjective 
perceptions. As we know “the office of President shall be held in turn by each 
Member State in the Council for a term of six months ...”. This will mean 
every 12 to 15 years in a Union with 25 to 30 Member States. This new 
scenario will drastically change the current national benefits, to an extent that 
the everlasting resistance to introduce changes in the institution are 
progressively reduced. The national profit will not compensate the system 
inefficiency any longer. A paragon of that change is Spain. If we remember, 
when the Finish report faced the General Affairs Council preparatory of the 
Helsinki European Council (December 1999), the Spanish Secretary of State 
for European Affairs, Mr. Ramón de Miguel Egea, carried out an allegation of 
the traditional States rights, which are radically opposed to any new spirit 
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needed in any deep change in the Council working methods. Such a position 
desired to maintain the system until the Spanish Presidency would take place. 
During the Spanish Presidency, Spain has become an advocate of deep 
institutional changes. In his speech at St. Anthony’s College, Aznar promoted 
the creation of an elected “President” for the EU. This is, no room for doubts, 
a revolutionary change, independently that he was thinking about his political 
career when making this proposition.  
Changes are needed and changes have already been introduced, especially 
during the Finish and Spanish Presidency. At first view, those changes 
basically affect the functioning of the institution: link between presidencies, 
agenda programming, etc. However, taking into account the leftovers of the 
Seville European Council (Council Backbone Presidents’ election and term, 
President of the Union) and its decisions (particularly the “Measures 
Concerning the Structure and Functioning of the Council”), a deeper 
transformation can be foreseen: another step towards a more 
intergovernmental Union. Actually, the only new actor introduced in the 
process is the European Council. In the new system the European Council will 
adopt the “multiannual strategic programme”. Consequently, the Heads of 
States or Government will increase their control on the EC legislative agenda.  
In Seville, the Heads of States or Government agreed that the European 
Council would develop this new role within the powers conferred to it by 
article 4 of EU Treaty. Thus, the “multiannual strategic programme” can be 
adopted within the power to define “general political guidelines”; that an EU 
(meta-juridical) institution can be an actor in the EC without being object of 
any political accountability or ECJ control. The opted path is far from being 
promising. To link such an EC structural reform to the European Council, 
without a previous full constitutionalization of the institution, will imply 
certain damage in the essential cornerstone of every political system, namely 
the rule of law. This could not only steer to the decisions’ illegitimacy, but to 
the deligitimation of the system. 
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